## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

```
DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BRIAN KEMP, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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## COALITION PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED DECLARATIONS

Coalition Plaintiffs file the attached redacted declarations of Harri Hursti
(Exhibit 1) and Marilyn Marks (Exhibit 2), originally filed at Doc. 800-2 and Doc.
800-3, respectively.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of August, 2020.
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## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

DONNA CURLING, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v.

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET AL., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989AT

## CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to LR 7.1(D), I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been prepared in accordance with the font type and margin requirements of LR 5.1, using font type of Times New Roman and a point size of 14.

/s/ Bruce P. Brown

Bruce P. Brown

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION 

DONNA CURLING, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v.

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER , ET AL., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989-
AT

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 24, 2020, a copy of the foregoing was
electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.

/s/ Bruce P. Brown

Bruce P. Brown


# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION 

```
DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs,
    vs.
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER,
    ET AL.,
        Defendants.
```


## DECLARATION OF HARRI HURSTI

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

1. My name is Harri Hursti. I am over the age of 21 and competent to give this testimony. The facts stated in this declaration are based on my personal knowledge, unless stated otherwise.
2. My background and qualifications in voting system cybersecurity are set forth in my prior declaration, at Document 480-1, pages 37 et seq.
3. This statement supplements my declaration of December 16, 2019. I stand by everything in the previous declaration.
4. I am engaged as an expert in this case by Coalition for Good Governance.
5. In developing my declaration and opinion, I visited Atlanta, Georgia, to personally observe certain operations of the June 9, 2020 statewide primary, and the August 11, 2020 runoff. During the June 9 election, I was an authorized poll watcher in some locations and was a public observer in others. On August 11, 2020, I was authorized as an expert inspecting and observing under the Coalition for Good Governance's Rule 34 Inspection activity in certain polling places and the Fulton County Election Preparation Center. I was a public observer in others. As I will explain below in this declaration, my extensive experience in voting system security and my observations in the two mentioned elections lead to my additional conclusions beyond those in my December 16, 2019 that:
a) the electronic pollbooks are based on general purpose consumer grade hardware and operating systems. They are not and cannot be adequately secured against malfunctioning or attacks. They require the standard, universally recommended risk reduction practice of having current paper pollbook backups to be used to issue ballots in the event of emergencies, equipment unreliability, or e-pollbook discrepancies;
b) furthermore, in my processional opinion, backed by "SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION" volumes I-V, electronic pollbook systems present a compelling attack surface for any domestic or foreign adversarial actor who considers disruption or sowing discord as one of the goals and therefore has to always have immediately available backup process;
c) if Georgia's PollPad system has been set to permit unlimited issuance of BMD voter access cards for a single voter, this would constitute a high risk and non-standard election process;
d) the voting system, including its PollPad and BMD related components, is being operated in Fulton County in a manner that escalates the security risk to an extreme level.

## Polling Place Observations

6. Election observation on Peachtree Christian Church. My observation at Peachtree Christian Church polling place was authorized by the Rule 34 inspection.
7. The polling location manager explained that he has been instructed to start using the paper backup to check in voters only after power outage which has lasted over 30 minutes.
8. He showed me the paper voter list, that based on the title page, appeared to have been prepared for June 9 primary election. (See Picture at Exhibit A). Marilyn Marks took this picture as she and I inspected the printed voter list.
9. Election observation on Central Park Recreation Center. I observed that the PollPad at one point had to be shut down and restarted at one station in attempt to troubleshoot a wireless networking issue. After restarting, the PollPad required no password from the operator to begin processing voter access smartcards to activate the Ballot Marking Device.
10. Subsequently, I was able to watch the State of Georgia Poll Pad Training Session for the August 11 election. David Greenwalt, Training Administrator for Southeast Elections Director for KnowInk says "One of the things that you'll notice if you worked in the June election, when we hit the Get

Started Button, we did not have to do the Poll Manager Log In. Um. It was decided after the June election that that was a redundant security measure and so we have excluded the Poll Worker Log In Screen from the process for the August election." at 10:22-10:44. This video is available at:

## https://player.vimeo.com/video/440680300?autoplay=1

11. Permitting operation of electronic pollbooks without password protection is an unacceptable practice from a voting system, or any system processing sensitive data, security standpoint. Federal Information Processing Standards allow no access to sensitive systems with weak passwords, obviously no password is categorically banned.
12. As seen in June in Georgia and across the United States, electronic poll-book systems frequently face issues causing delayed openings of the polling locations and/or long lines. Many times, explanations for electronic pollbook failures have not been investigated, while some studies have found issues in system design. Measures like removing passwords, and therefore weakening the security should never be a workaround to reliability issues.
13. Other states like New Hampshire have added contingency requirements, for example that the electronic poll-book system must be able to
produce an in-location paper backup when needed allowing resuming operation on paper with maximum allowed delay of 15 minutes.
14. Election observation in Central Park Recreation Center. My August 11 observation at Central Park Recreation was authorized by the Coalition's Rule 34 inspection.
15. The Poll place manager told me that no Dominion trained technician had reported on location to help them that morning.
16. Poll workers told me that the electronic poll books were failing to synchronize their check-ins, and therefore they diverted into a manual process to add up the totals from the poll books. When I was present, poll workers started to troubleshoot the issue. Within 10 minutes, they realized that 3 out of 4 poll books were synchronizing and one of the poll books was not connecting to the others while not providing any other indication of that than a yellow warning icon. The pollworkers told me that, until this troubleshooting, which started about 1 hour and 45 minutes after the polls had been opened, the poll workers had assumed that none of the pollbooks synchronized with each other. It is unclear if that was the original situation which had partially self-cured, but with lack of warning messages, the poll workers were apparently missing the changing status of the wireless network.
17. While they were attempting to troubleshoot the issue by rebooting, one of the poll workers realized which poll books had the problem and said that she knew how to access Wi-Fi and Bluetooth setting of the poll books. They managed to reset the connections and connect all poll books around 9 am of the Election Day to working condition.
18. Election observation in Fanplex location. I was at the Fanplex polling place authorized by the Rule 34 inspection. The Fanplex Polling location had accuracy issues with the electronic pollbooks. Voters belonging to a new precinct (0F1) included in the location were not found on the electronic pollbook system. Poll watchers and poll workers reported that once the poll officials followed the telephone instructions of the Elections Office, the voters in 0F1 precinct appeared in the PollPad. However, all voters in the precinct were reportedly displayed as having voted a mail ballot, although voters stated it was inaccurate.
19. It is impossible without an in-depth examination to know the cause of the problem that would cause the voter records to appear in these improper ways. These are prime examples of the need for an updated back up paper pollbook so that such discrepancies can be handled in the polling place permitting voting to continue.
20. Election observation at Park Tavern. I was at Park Tavern polling place authorized by the Rule 34 inspection. Poll workers operating electronic pollbooks explained that during this election they were not connected into the Internet like they were in the previous election. They stated that they are using local area wireless networking.

## Conclusions

21. The current implementation of electronic pollbooks is not stable and caused delayed openings of the polling locations and long lines. To try and correct this instability, passwords were removed, but removing the passwords makes them a vulnerable, high risk high reward attack target for an adversary of any skill level who either seeks publicity or is deliberately disenfranchising targeted voters. Passwords must be required. In addition, it is imperative that up-to-date paper pollbook backups to be used to issue ballots in the event of emergencies, equipment unreliability, or e-pollbook discrepancies.

Executed this 21st day of August 2020.

Harri Hursti

## EXHIBIT A

Picture taken by Marilyn Marks when I was present:

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## DECLARATION OF MARILYN MARKS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

1. My name is Marilyn Marks.
2. I have personal knowledge of all facts stated in this declaration, and if called to testify, I could and would testify competently thereto.
3. I am the Executive Director of Coalition for Good Governance, a Plaintiff in this case.

## August 11, 2020 Polling Place Observations

4. I personally observed polling place operations on August 11, 2020 Election Day in three Fulton County polling places and the Fulton County tabulation center. I observed operations at Peachtree Christian Church, Central Park Recreation, and the Fulton County Election Preparation Center under the provisions of Rule 34 as part of Coalition Plaintiffs' discovery activities. I observed polling place operations at the Fanplex polling place as an authorized poll watcher.
5. I accompanied Coalition's consulting cybersecurity and ballot scanning technology expert Harri Hursti in his security review of Election Day activities. We arrived at Peachtree Christian Church at approximately 6:30 am prior to the opening of the polls. Mr. Waymon Ware, the poll manager, greeted us
and showed us the set up. Mr. Ware stated that he had managed this particular poll since the mid-1990's.
6. I was observing when one of the PollPads was malfunctioning and had to be shut down and restarted. I noted that the worker was not required to enter a password to put the PollPad in operation again.
7. This lack of password protection is consistent with the Secretary of State's video PollPad pollworker training specifically for the August 11, 2020 election which can be viewed at this link.
(https://player.vimeo.com/video/440680300?autoplay=1) The training beginning at timestamp 7:15 does not reference a need for a password to operate the PollPad. Richard Barron, Fulton County Election Director, also told me that the State now considers the PollPad password to be an unneeded, redundant security measure. By contrast, according to what I was told by representatives of Coalition for Good Governance who observed the June 9, 2020 elections, at that time passwords were required to start-up the PollPads.
8. I asked Mr. Ware to allow Mr. Hursti and me to review the paper voter list that is supplied to the polling place by the Secretary of State. He said that he rarely opens the sealed envelopes with the printed voter lists. He stated that it would be a very unusual emergency such as losing all power and battery backup that would cause him to use such a paper backup list.
9. Mr. Ware showed me the voter list. To my surprise, the list was dated June 9, 2020. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a photograph that I took of the June 9, 2020 voter list that Mr. Ware showed me. The voter list therefore appeared more than 2 months out of date and would not have included voters who registered in the meantime, or shown that people voted early or absentee in the August 11 election, or shown the party the voters selected for the June 9 election so that the proper runoff ballot could be issued.
10. Mr. Ware told Mr. Hursti and me several times that provisional ballots are used for all "emergencies," and that any voter issued a paper ballot would be required to complete provisional paperwork and submit it as a provisional ballot.
11. Mr. Ware showed me his 700 ballot stock of emergency or provisional ballots. He stated that the number of registered voters at this polling place was approximately 5,000.
12. I heard a voter tell a poll worker that he had not received the mail ballot that he had requested. I then overheard one of the poll workers calling the Elections Office to determine whether a ballot from this voter had been received. After several minutes of being on hold and then talking with the Elections Office personnel, the pollworkers issued the voter a smartcard using the PollPad in order to activate the BMD .
13. I confirmed with one of the pollworkers that they were required to call the office to obtain this information about all voter's absentee ballots rather than check the paper voter list because the paper list was not current.
14. During my time at the Peachtree Christian polling place I was able to see from over 30 feet away how most voters were voting because of the size and position of the screens. The positioning of the equipment permitted the poll workers to have a direct view at almost all times of the voters' votes on most of the touchscreens.
15. Although the printed BMD ballot was short and easy to review, less than half of the voters I observed voting at Peachtree Christian took the time to review the printed ballot before casting it in the scanner.
16. Mr. Hursti and I then went to the Central Park Recreation polling place where the traffic was very light. The pollworkers told us about the long lines that they had experienced on the June 9 Election Day. These long lines were widely reported, including in the following Washington Post article.

## (https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/voting-june-9-

primaries/2020/06/09/df6b8aa2-a9e7-11ea-a9d9-a81c1a491c52_story.html )
17. Ms. Kathleen King served as the provisional ballot poll officer. She told me in detail about the problems the poll worker team had with the Poll Pads on the June 9 Election Day -- the majority of the PollPads were inoperable causing
a dramatic slow-down in voting. When the PollPads malfunctioned, the Central Park Recreation polling place had no ability to process emergency hand marked paper ballots (despite having plenty of ballots) because pollworkers, without a paper pollbook backup, had no way to determine if voters were eligible. Ms. King stated that the inoperability of PollPads on June 9 was primarily due to the lack of enough power cords or back up batteries.
18. It was clear to me in talking with Ms. King and Mr. Ware that the State had not provided the training or documentation required to use emergency hand marked paper ballots for either the June 9 or August 11 elections. With no current up-to-date paper pollbook, the pollworkers had no way to know whether to issue a ballot to a voter presenting herself to vote, other than calling the Elections Office, if they could reach someone on the phone. Pollworkers also complained that it was difficult to reach someone on the phone at the Fulton Elections office. I overhead phone conversations on the poll workers' speaker phones in Peachtree Christian and Fanplex polling places. Some poll workers were put on hold several minutes at a time - an intolerable delay given the need for prompt information.
19. Attachment B is a true and correct copy of public records produced by Henry County and annotated by Beatrice Brown, CGG intern, under my supervision. Exhibit B is a selection from the Henry County Electors List that was provided to Henry County by the Secretary of State. These pages have been
annotated by Ms. Brown to show the activity for the particular voters listed that occurred after the printing of the voter lists. Ms. Brown obtained the annotated information from the Henry County June 9 election mail and in-person absentee (early voting) files from the Secretary of State's website. The annotations show that the Henry County Electors List provided by the Secretary of State for the polling place did not show activity recorded after approximately May 25, 2020 for the June 9 election.

## Pollpad Failure to Control Access Card Issuance

20. In a conversation with Cherokee County Voting System Manager

Johnathan Densmore on or about August 4, 2020, Mr. Densmore told me that in testing the PollPads in Cherokee County, he learned that the PollPad system permits the issuance of multiple access cards to a single voter.
21. He told me that he tested the Cherokee County PollPads and determined that he could issue an unlimited number of encoded cards to a voter, and that would permit the voter to create and cast multiple ballots.
22. I received an email from Mr. Densmore on August 19, 2020 confirming that Cherokee County's PollPads do not limit the number of cards to be issued to a voter. A true and correct copy of the email is attached at Exhibit C.

## PollPad and Ballot Accounting--Ballot Recap Sheets

23. Coalition for Good Governance representatives working under my supervision made a public record inspection of the Fulton County Ballot Recap Sheets for the June 9 election. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of seven Ballot Recap Sheets. The Ballot Recap Sheet is used to ensure that the number of voters and ballots cast in the polling place as shown by the public counters on the PollPads, BMD touchscreens and the precinct scanner agree (or can be reconciled) at the close of the polls. As stated in the title (in bold) at the bottom of the first page of Exhibit D: "Section C: Grand Totals - Number of Persons Voting (all totals 1-3 should match)."
24. However, many Ballot Recap Sheets reported a material difference between the 3 counts required. Exhibit D is just a small sample of the many recap sheets that did not reconcile. To attempt to determine the cause of these discrepancies, one would need to access the PollPad logs, the scanner logs, the BMD logs, the ballots themselves, or provisional ballot logs, depending on the particular discrepancy. Coalition for Good Governance has not had access to additional Fulton County public records to determine the causes of the discrepancies.

Executed this 20th day of August 2020.

> Marilyn Marks


FULTON ELECTORS LIST FOR COUNTY PRECINCT/COUNTY DISTRICTS 06/09/2020 - JUNE 9, 2020 GEN. PRI./GEN. NPISPEC. ELECTION

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B

## Election Day

## The Line

- Have the poll workers monitor voters in line to ensure there is no campaigning in line or wearing campaign materials.
- Have the poll worker notify the voters of the required identification needed to vote and to have it ready to present to the poll work at the Poll Pad Station.
- Consider providing that poll worker with an electors list, a portable Poll Pad, or a device that can access MVP to look up voters in line to ensure that they are at the correct polling location.
- If the line is caused by a long ballot or long questions on the ballot, be sure to have extra sample ballots available to pass out to voters in line. The more prepared they are when they get to the voting machine, the quicker you will be able to
 process them.


## Electors List <br> Three Lists at Polling Place

## There are three separate lists of voters at each polling location

- Poll Pad - Poll Pad digitally stores registered voter information for each county in Georgia. Poll Pads allows you to search for voters and check their eligibility for the election. If they have not voted during Advanced in Person or by Absentee by Mail, they are issued a voter card to vote. The voter inserts the card into the Touchscreen, makes their selections and prints their ballot and then after reviewing their ballot, inserts it into the Polling Place Scanner to cast their vote. The voter is added to the Numbered List of Voters.
- Supplemental List - The supplemental list contains the voters that met the Voter Registration deadline, but did not meet the deadline for the Poll Pad upload. Anyone that is not on the Poll Pad but is on the supplemental list is allowed to vote on the Touchscreen unit. These voters do not need to vote provisionally. A voter card is manually created for these voters.
- Paper Back Up List - The paper back up list is a list of all the electors in your precinct. If your polling place loses power or your Poll Pads stop working for some reason, you do not have to stop processing voters. This is what the paper list is for.


## Election Day

## Polling Place Stations

## Poll Pad Station

- At this station
- The voter is searched in the Poll Pad using the voter's ID by scanning or manually entering the voter's name
- If found, the voter certificate process is started
- If the voter cannot be verified as eligible to vote, the voter should be escorted to the Provisional Ballot Station
- Voter completes the electronic voter certificate
- A voter card is encoded with the ballot and given to the voter
- The voter's name is electronically added to the Numbered List of Voters
- The voter is then directed to the Touchscreen and Printer Station


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## SECURE <br> THE KOTE

(Con't Supplies)
Q: What's the latest on using security paper for absentee and emergency ballots?
A: We will not be using Secure paper for those ballots.
Q: Will the header for the primary ballots be color coded like in the past or will they be black and white?
A: They will be black and white only.
Q: Will we have enough provisionals to cover the issue?
A: You will need to have paper ballots for provisional voting and for some backup scenarios. Consult SEB Rules 183-1-12-.11, 183-1-12-.18, and 183-1-12-, 20 to ensure there are enough paper ballots for various scenarios while conducting elections.

Q: Will the voter certificates we need to have at the polls on Election Day in case of emergency be the same as we used in 2018 or are they new?
A: 2019 Version.
Q: Do we need specific information on the type of paper to use for Absentee/Provisional/Emergency?
A: The paper specifications and the qualified printers have been posted to Firefly > Training > Dominion Voting Systems > Checklist and Quick Reference Guides.

Q: Is the Secretary of State providing any ballot paper at all or is it totally up to the counties to order the paper from Dominion?
A: It is the responsibility of the counties to order the paper.
Q: Could I order some absentee ballots from Printer Company and then print the rest of my absentee ballots after I get the ballot printer and EMS System?
A: Yes, we suggest you make plans to order your ballots from a printer for the PPP.
Q: Are we going to use paper voter certificates on Election Day?
A: No.

## Q: Are Blackout screens for the ICX allowable?

A: We are looking at solutions to the screen privacy issue. Be sure to arrange BMDs to assure voter privacy. See SEB Rule 183-1-12-.11(4).

Q: Have the absentee ballot envelopes changed in size? A: No.

## SECURE THE KOTE

## (Con't Procedures - Before Voting)

Q: Will it be a requirement of the poll manager to take custody of the blank ballot paper like they currently do with Expresspolls, electors list, etc. to bring to the polling place?
A: No. The ballot paper can be delivered with the printers and secured with the polling place equipment.

Q: Will we use paper voter certificates?
A: Only as emergency backup. The electronic voter certificate on the Poll Pad will be used for Election Day, See SEB Rule 183-1-12-.11 - Conducting Elections.

Q: What am I supposed to do with all the Secure the Vote posters I received?
A: These posters and pamphlets are for your use to promote the new system and educate the voters. We encourage you to put up the posters in your county buildings and put the pamphlets out in your public reception areas.

Q: What does "secure the equipment at the polling place" mean?
A: See SEB Rule 183-1-12-.04 - Storage, Maintenance, and Transport of Statewide Voting System Components.

- The space where the components are stored shall be secured and accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent. See SEB Rule 183-1-12-.04(2).
- The storage areas for the voting system components at the county election office or other designated county facility shall be equipped with one or more of the named forms of surveillance listed in SEB Rule 183-1-12-.04(3). See Rule 183-1-12-.04(3) for examples.
- The election Superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all electronic ballot markers and ballot scanners in storage and all seal numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent. See SEB Rule 183-1-12-.04(4).
- All components of the voting system shall be securely transported to polling places. Electronic ballot markers (including printers) and ballot scanners shall be transported in secure boxes or carrying cases. See SEB Rule 183-1-12-.04(5).
- Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, all components of the voting system shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access. See SEB Rule 183-1-12-.04(6).


## SECURE <br> THE KOTE

## USING EMERGENCY PAPER BALLOTS

If an emergency situation makes utilizing the electronic ballot markers impossible, impracticable, or if emergency ballots are otherwise needed as determined by the election superintendent, the poll officer shall issue the voter an emergency paper ballot that is to be filled out with a pen after verifying the identity of the voter and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct. While the determination of an emergency situation is in the discretion of the election superintendent, the types of events that may be considered emergencies are power outages, malfunctions causing a sufficient number of electronic ballot markers to be unavailable for use, or waiting times longer than 30 minutes. (SEB Rule 183-1-12-. 11 (2) (c) \& (d))

## Items Needed:

- Emergency Ballots
- The election superintendent shall cause each polling place to have a sufficient amount of emergency paper ballots so that voting may continue uninterrupted if emergency circumstances render the electronic ballot markers or printers unusable. For any primary or general election for which a state or federal candidate is on the ballot, a sufficient amount of emergency paper ballots shall be at least $10 \%$ of the number of registered voters assigned to a polling place. (SEB Rule 183-1-12-. 11 (2)(c))
- Emergency Ballots must be secured prior to use.
- Pens
- Dominion Voting Approved Pens
- Sharpie Fine Point Black (part \#: 30001 SKU: 071641300019 ).
- Paper Mate Flair M Medium Point Black, (part \#: 8430152, SKU: 041540843016).


## Voting Procedures:

- The poll officer shall verify the identity of the voter and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct.
- On the Poll pad, the poll officer will select "Emergency Ballot" instead of "Touchscreen," and hit "submit" in order to finalize check-in of the voter. No voter access card is needed or created.
- The poll officer shall provide an emergency ballot to the voter that is to be filled out with a pen.
- The voter shall mark their ballot with a pen in an area that provides voter privacy.
- The voter shall scan their ballot in the scanner connected to the ballot box.
- Emergency ballots shall not be treated as provisional ballots, but instead shall be placed into the scanner in the same manner that printed ballots in the polling place are scanned.
- All unused emergency ballots shall be placed into a secure envelope and sealed such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.


## Rule 183-1-12-.11

voter access card from the touchscreen component, review the selections on his or her printed ballot, scan his or her printed ballot into the scanner, and return the voter access card to a poll officer. Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.
(c) If an emergency situation makes utilizing the electronic ballot markers impossible or impracticable, as determined by the election superintendent, the poll officer shall issue the voter an emergency paper ballot that is to be filled out with a pen after verifying the identity of the voter and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct. Emergency paper ballots shall not be treated as provisional ballots, but instead shall be placed into the scanner in the same manner that printed ballots in the polling place are scanned. The election superintendent shall cause each polling place to have a sufficient amount of emergency paper ballots so that voting may continue uninterrupted if emergency circumstances render the electronic ballot markers or printers unusable. For any primary or general election for which a state or federal candidate is on the ballot, a sufficient amount of emergency paper ballots shall be at least $10 \%$ of the number of registered voters to a polling place. The poll manager shall store all emergency ballots in a secure manner and ensure that all used and unused emergency ballots are accounted for. All unused emergency ballots shall be placed into a secure envelope and sealed such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.
(d) If an emergency situation exists that makes voting on the electronic ballot markers impossible or impracticable, the poll manager shall alert the election superintendent as soon as possible. The existence of an emergency situation shall be in the discretion of the election supervisor. However, if a poll manager is unable to contact the election superintendent after diligent effort, the poll manager shall have the ability to declare that an emergency situation exists at the polling place. The poll manager shall continue diligent efforts to contact the election superintendent, and shall inform the superintendent as soon as possible of the situation at the polling place. The election superintendent, in his or her discretion, shall either overrule or concur with the declaration of emergency circumstances. While the determination of an emergency situation is in the discretion of the election superintendent, the types of events that may be considered emergencies are power outages, malfunctions causing a sufficient number of electronic ballot markers to be unavailable for use, or waiting times longer than 30 minutes.
3. At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the enclosed space to verify that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to any voting system component or placed in the voting booth and that the voting system components have not been tampered with in any manner. Poll officers shall also check that no unattended ballots are left in the printer or anywhere in the enclosed space other than the appropriate ballot box. Any unattended ballots found in the enclosed space that do not belong to a voter currently in the enclosed space shall not be counted, but shall be secured and labelled as unattended ballots.
4. The polling place shall be arranged in such a manner as to provide for the privacy of the elector while voting and to allow monitoring of each voting system component by the poll officers while the polls are open. The electronic ballot markers and ballot scanners used in the polling place shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, at least one ballot marking device shall be configured for voting by physically disabled

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| IDR | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Voter } \\ & \text { Reg \# } \end{aligned}$ | EL | RO | Status | Name | Date of nith | Residence Address | District Combo \# | CNG | SEN | HSE | JUD | COM | SCH | WRD | MUNIB | SCM | SBD | Chall |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | ${ }^{1} \mathrm{Ba}$ | lot issu | es 4/22 | /2020 | Not ret | Nine |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | ${ }^{1} \mathrm{Ba}$ | lot iss | les $4 / 29$ | /2020 | Not re | urned |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | ${ }^{1} \mathrm{R}$ | Return¢ | d 6/3/2 | 020 |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | Returne | ed 6/3/2 | 2020 |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{1}$ | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | LRG | Return | ned 5/1 | 1/2020 | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| No |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |



| COM | SCH | WRD | MUNIB | SCM | SBD | Chall |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ${ }^{1}$ | ${ }^{1}$ | Returned 6/1/2020 |  | NO |  |  |
| 1 | 1 | Returned 6/3/2020 |  | NO |  |  |
| 1 | ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | ${ }^{1}$ | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | Returned 5/26/2020 |  | NO |  |  |
| 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | Returned 5/26/2020 | NO |  |  |  |
| 1 | ${ }^{1}$ | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |


| IDR | Voter Reg\# | EL | RO | Status | Name | Date of Birth | Residence Address | District Combo \# | CNG | SEN | HSE | JUD | COM | SCH | WRD | MUNIB | SCM | SBD | Chall |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | No |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\dagger$ | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | $\uparrow$ |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | Retu | rned 5, | 14/2020 |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { LRG } \\ & \text { Retur } \end{aligned}$ | ned 5/3 | 30/2020 |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | Retur | ned 5/1 | 14/2020 |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{1}$ | 1 | LRG |  |  | * | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | Retur | ned 5/1 | 14/2020 |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | LRG |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| SCH | WRD | MUNIB | SCM | SBD | Chall |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Retur | ned 5/8/8 | 8/2020 |  | NO |
| 1 | Retu | rned 5 | 8/2020 |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 | Return | ned 5/2 | 1/2020 |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  | r | No |
| 1 | Retur | ned 4/3 | 30/2020 |  | NO |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | Return | ned 5/2 | 1/202 |  | No |
| $\dagger$ | Return | ned 5/9 | 7/2029 |  | NO |


| IDR | Voter Reg\# | EL | RO | Status | Name | Date of Birth | Residence Address | District Combo \# | CNG | SEN | HSE | JUD | COM | SCH | WRD | MUNIB | SCM | SBD | Chall |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLiN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FUIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FIIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FUIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 | Retu | ed 5/61 | 6/2020 |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 | Retu | ned 5/6/2 | 6/2020 | F | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FUN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN |  |  |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | FLIN | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | No |


| COM | SCH | WRD | MUNIB | SCM | SBD | Chall |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | ${ }^{1}$ Iss | ned 4/2 | 1/2020 | Not R | eturned | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  | - |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | Retur | ned 5/2 | 26/2020 |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | Retu | Irned 5 | /26/202 | 20 | NO |
| 1 | 1 | Ret | Irned 5 | 3/26/202 | 20 | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | Ret | ed 5 | 26/20 |  | No |
| 1 | 1 |  |  | 8/2020 |  | NO |
|  |  | Retu | rned 6 | 8/202 |  |  |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | No |
| $\dagger$ | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 | Retur | rned 5 | 26/2020 | 0 | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| $\uparrow$ | 1 | Retur | ned 6/1 | 10/2020 |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |
| 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  | NO |





Subject: Re: Follow up on Poll Pad function and multiple card issuance
Date: Wednesday, August 19, 2020 at 12:58:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Johnathan Densmore
To: Marilyn Marks

Good afternoon Mrs. Marks. Yes, the attorney or someone did not fully understand that question. I have all the test ballots from L\&A for the June election, and I will be glad to get those to you electronically. I do have a small issue however, due to the required space for all of the Dominion equipment, we are having to move our office location and I will not have the ability to scan the ballots until the copy/scanner is installed at the new location. I should be able to begin copying those ballots on Friday of this week, or Monday at the latest.

Yes per our conversation, the poll pads can issue an unlimited number of voter access cards to same voter, with no override pass-code or anything required from the Election Office.

Thank you
Johnathan
From: Marilyn Marks [Marilyn@USCGG.org](mailto:Marilyn@USCGG.org)
Sent: Wednesday, August 19, 2020 11:11 AM
To: Johnathan Densmore [johndenz80@hotmail.com](mailto:johndenz80@hotmail.com)
Cc: Kim Stancil [kstancil@cherokeega.com](mailto:kstancil@cherokeega.com); Samantha Whitley [cgganalyst2@gmail.com](mailto:cgganalyst2@gmail.com)
Subject: Follow up on Poll Pad function and multiple card issuance
Hello Johnathan,
I hope that all went well in the August 11 runoff.
I want to follow up on our discussion about the Poll Pads and your observation of their ability to issue multiple ballots voter access cards. As I understood what you told me, through your testing, you determined that if a pollworker wished to issue multiple voter access cards to a voter, the PollPad does not limit multiple card issuance for activation of the BMDs which would allow for creating multiple ballots. Please confirm whether I stated this correctly.

Also if there are documents including notes on this topic, please forward them as a public record.

Thanks very much for your help and service to Cherokee voters.
Marilyn Marks
Executive Director
Coalition for Good Governance
Cell: 7042929802
Marilyn@USCGG.org
Follow me@MarilynRMarks1


USE BALL POINT PEN Bear Down－You Are Making Three Copies yruow tine to check of Soppeloe Court／City Clerk． Yellow whet to clerk on Sur p coinenkob hent to 角edlalit TIME LAST VOTER VOTED county／municiralty Fulfoll

## BALLOT RECAP SHEET

SECTION A：BALLOT MARKING DEVICE（BMD）

|  | TOUCHSCREEN <br> SERIAL NUMBER | PUBLIC COUNT <br> AT OPENING | BALLOTSPRINIED |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 231267 | 6 | 20 |  |
| 2 | 130157 | 6 | 45 |  |
| 3 | 040137 | 6 | 57 |  |
| 4 | 130213 | 6 | 51 |  |
| 5 | 281535 | 6 | 55 |  |
| 6 | 131613 | 8 | 54 |  |
| 7 | 230058 | 8 | 54 |  |
| 8 | 130325 | 6 | 37 |  |
| 9 | 080616 | 6 | 46 |  |
| 10 | 051754 | 6 | 47 |  |
| 11 |  |  |  |  |
| 12 |  |  | $46 l$ |  |


a）BALLOTS PRINTED ON BMD（Add totals from above two columns）
b）EMERGENCY BALLOTS ISSUED（If any）
c）TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED（add a＋b）
d）BALLOTS SPOILED（From Spoiled Ballot Log）
e）TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED \＆CAST $(c-d)$

SECTION B：SCANNER
f）SCANNER Serial \＃AAFAJJROO6 3 SCANNER Serial \＃ $\qquad$ BALLOTS CAST（From Tape） 455 BALLOTS CAST（From Tape） $\qquad$
a） 466
b） $\qquad$
c） $\qquad$
d）
$\qquad$
e） TOTAL TAPES f） $\qquad$
g）UNSCANNED BALLOTS FROM EMERGENCY BIN（if any）
h）TOTAL BALLOTS CAST ON SCANNER（ $\mathrm{f}+\mathrm{g}$ ）
g）
h） $\qquad$
SECTION C：GRAND TOTALS－NUMBER OF PERSONS VOTING（all totals 1 － 3 should match）


Poll Manager and both Assistant Managers mus sign．


Poll Manager

Assistant Manager

This form was completed by EPC staff and signed by poll workers after completion．


## BALLOT RECAP SHEET

SECTION A: BALLOT MARKING DEVICE (BMD)

a) BALLOTS PRINTED ON BMD (Add totals from above two columns)
b) EMERGENCY BALLOTS ISSUED (If any)
c) TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED (add a + b)
d) BALLOTS SPOILED (From Spoiled Ballot Log)
e) TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED \& CAST ( $c$ - d)
BALLOTS CAST (From Tape) $\qquad$ BALLOTS CAST (From Tape) TOTAL TAPES f$)$

## SECTION B: SCANNER <br> f) SCANNER Serial \#AAFAJJO 310 SCANNER Serial \# <br> $\qquad$ <br> g) UNSCANNED BALLOTS FROM EMERGENCY BIN (if any) <br> h) TOTAL BALLOTS CAST ON SCANNER ( $f+g$ )

$\qquad$
$\qquad$
h)


SECTION C: GRAND TOTALS - NUMBER OF PERSONS VOTING (all totals $1-3$ should match)

| 1. TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED \& CAST - SECTION A; (e) | TOTAL |
| :--- | ---: |
| 2. TOTAL BALLOTS CAST ON SCANNER - SECTION B; ( $h$ ) | 530 |
| 3. POLL PAD CHECKINS + SUPPLEMENTAL VOTERS From Poll Pad Recap - Line F | 530 |

Poll Manager and both Assistant Managers must sign.




## USE BALL POINT PEN <br> Bear Down - You Are Making Three Copies

WHITE sheet to Secretary of State
YELLOW sheet to Clerk of Superior Court/City Clerk
PINK sheet to Superintendent
GOLDENROD sheet to Registrar COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY $\qquad$

## BALLOT RECAP SHEET

SECTION A: BALLOT MARKING DEVICE (BID)

|  | TOUCHSCREEN <br> SERIAL NUMBER | PUBLIC COUNT <br> AT OPENING | BALLOTS PRINTED <br> AT CLOSING |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 250678 | $\varnothing$ | 56 |
| 2 | 070333 | 8 | 31 |
| 3 | 253459 | $\varnothing$ | 30 |
| 4 | 130330 | $\varnothing$ | 15 |
| 5 | 130142 | $\varnothing$ | 37 |
| 6 | 130136 | 8 | 65 |
| 7 | 051239 | $\varnothing$ | 0 |
| 8 | 051257 | 8 | 14 |
| 9 | 040135 | $\varnothing$ | 11 |
| 10 | 090555 | $\varnothing$ | 41 |
| 11 |  |  |  |
| 12 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 8 |


|  | TOUCHSCREEN <br> UNIT NUMBER | PUBLIC COUNT <br> AT OPENING | BALLOTS PRINTED <br> AT CLOSING |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 13 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24 | TOTAL BALLOTS PRINTED (a) |  |  |  |  |

a) BALLOTS PRINTED ON BMD (Add totals from above two columns)
b) EMERGENCY BALLOTS ISSUED (If any)
c) TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED (add a + b)
d) BALLOTS SPOILED (From Spoiled Ballot Log)
e) TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED \& CAST ( $\mathbf{c}-\mathrm{d}$ )
a) 300
$\qquad$
b)
c) $\qquad$
d)
e)

## SECTION B: SCANNER

f) SCANNER Serial \# AAFAJJ 20123 BALLOTS CAST (From Tape) $\qquad$ 286
 TOTAL TAPES f)
$\qquad$
h) $\qquad$
g)
g) UNSCANNED BALLOTS FROM EMERGENCY BIN (if any)
h) TOTAL BALLOTS CAST ON SCANNER ( $\mathbf{f}+\mathrm{g}$ )

SECTION C: GRAND TOTALS - NUMBER OF PERSONS VOTING (all totals 1-3 should match)


Poll Manager and both Assistant Managers must sign.


This form was completed by EPC staff and signed by poll workers after completion.
 PRECINCT $\qquad$ BALLOT RECAP SHEET

SECTION A: BALLOT MARKING DEVICE (BMD)


|  | TOUCHSCREeN <br> UNIT NUMBER | PUBLIC COUNT <br> AT OPENING | BALLOTS PRINTED <br> AT CLOSING |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 13 |  |  |  |
| 14 |  |  |  |
| 15 |  |  |  |
| 16 |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |
| 18 |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |
| 20 |  |  |  |
| 21 |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |  |
| 24 |  |  |  |

a) BALLOTS PRINTED ON BMD (Add totals from above two columns)
b) EMERGENCY BALLOTS ISSUED (If any)
c) TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED (add a + b)
d) BALLOTS SPOILED (From Spoiled Ballot Log)
e) TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED \& CAST ( $\mathbf{c}-\mathrm{d}$ )

## SECTION B: SCANNER

f) SCANNER Serial \# AAFAJJOZ171 SCANNER Serial \# $\qquad$ BALLOTS CAST (From Tape) $\qquad$ BALLOTS CAST (From Tape) $\qquad$
$\qquad$
g) UNSCANNED BALLOTS FROM EMERGENCY BIN (if any)
h) TOTAL BALLOTS CAST ON SCANNER ( $f+g$ )
a)
$\qquad$
c) $\qquad$
e)

TOTAL TAPES f)
$\qquad$
$\qquad$ h)
g)
 This form was completed by EPC staff and signed by poll workers after completion.



BALLOT RECAP SHEET
SECTION A: BALLOT MARKING DEVICE (BID)


|  | TOUCHSCREEN <br> UNIT NUMBER | PUBLIC COUNT <br> AT OPENING | BALLOTS PRINTED <br> AT CLOSING |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 13 |  |  |  |
| 14 |  |  |  |
| 15 |  |  |  |
| 16 |  |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |  |
| 18 |  |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |  |
| 20 |  |  |  |
| 21 |  |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |  |
| 24 |  |  |  |
|  | TOTAL BALLOTS PRINTED (a) |  |  |

a) BALLOTS PRINTED ON BMD (Add totals from above two columns)
b) EMERGENCY BALLOTS ISSUED (If any)
c) TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED (add a + b)
a)

115
d) BALLOTS SPOILED (From Spoiled Ballot Log)
e) TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED \& CAST $(c-d)$
b) $\qquad$
d)
e) $\qquad$

CION B: SCANNER
f) SCANNER Serial \# SCANNER Serial \#
 7 BALLOTS CAST (From Tape) $\qquad$ $010 \theta$ BALLOTS CAST (From Tape) TOTAL TAPES f) $\qquad$
g) h) $\qquad$
g) UNSCANNED BALLOTS FROM EMERGENCY BIN (if any)
h) TOTAL BALLOTS CAST ON SCANNER ( $\mathbf{f}+\mathrm{g}$ )

## ch)

CTION C: GRAND TOTALS - NUMBER OF PERSONS VOTING (all totals $\mathbf{1} \mathbf{- 3}$ should match)

| CION C: GRAND TOTALS - NUMBER OF PERSONS | TOTAL |
| :--- | :---: |
| TOTAL BALLOTS ISSUED \& CAST - SECTION A; (e) | 115 |
| TOTAL BALLOTS CAST ON SCANNER - SECTION B; ( $h$ ) | 100 |
| POLL PAD CHECKINS + SUPPLEMENTAL VOTERS From Poll Pad Recap - Line F | 18 |

M Manager and both Assistant Managers must sign.


[^0]:    FULTON ELECTORS LIST FOR COUNTY PRECINCT/COUNTY DISTRICTS
    06/09/2020 -- JUNE 9, 2020 GEN. PRI./GEN. NP/SPEC. ELECTION
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