X H I B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

DONNA CURLING,	et al.,)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	CIVIL ACTION FILE
V.)	
)	NO. 1:17-cv-02989-AT
BRAD RAFFENSPERGE	R, et al.,)	
Defendants.)	

STATEMENT UNDER OATH JESSE EVANS

August 16, 2020



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

DONNA CURLING, et al.,)
Plaintiffs, vs.)) CIVIL FILE ACTION) NO. 1:17-cv-02989-AT
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, et al.,)
Defendants.)

STATEMENT UNDER OATH

JESSE EVANS

August 16, 2020

2:15 p.m.

Via Zoom Videoconferencing

Reported by: Marsi Koehl, CCR-B-2424



Statement Under Oath JESSE EVANS

8/16/2020

_ [
1		CONTENTS	
2	E	XAMINATION	
3			
4			Page
5	Examination by Mr.	Brown	4
6			
7			
8		EXHIBITS	
9	Exhibit No.	De a sud a bid a su	Doors
10		Description	Page
11	Exhibit 1	Polling Location Setup Resolution Policy	33
12		Resolution Folley	
13	(Original exhibit a	attached to original transc:	ript)
14	(01191101 011112210 (accacined to orraniar crames.	22017
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

Statement Under Oath
JESSE EVANS

8/16/2020

```
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
 1
    On behalf of the Plaintiffs:
 2
          BRUCE P. BROWN
 3
          Attorney at Law BRUCE P. BROWN LAW, LLC
 4
          1123 Zonolite Road
          Suite 6
 5
          Atlanta, Georgia 30306 (404) 881-0700
 6
          bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com
 7
 8
    Also present:
 9
          Marilyn Marks, Coalition for Good Governance
10
          Jeanne Dufort, Coalition for Good Governance
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

Statement Under Oath JESSE EVANS

8/16/2020

1	PROCEEDINGS				
2	JESSE EVANS,				
3	having been first duly sworn, was examined and				
4	testified as follows:				
5	EXAMINATION				
6	BY MR. BROWN:				
7	Q. Please state your name for the record.				
8	A. Jesse Evans.				
9	Q. Mr. Evans, this is (audio faded).				
10	A. You're cutting in and out, Bruce.				
11	Q. Yeah, that static is not from me.				
12	A. It's gone now.				
13	Q. Jesse, can you hear me now?				
14	A. Sure.				
15	MR. BROWN: This will be a sworn				
16	statement pursuant to 28 USC § 1746.				
17	BY MR. BROWN:				
18	Q. Mr. Evans, although we're not in court and				
19	this is not a formal deposition with the opposing				
20	parties and other lawyers, you understand that you				
21	are sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth and				
22	nothing but the truth; correct?				
23	A. Yes.				
24	Q. And that the if you don't tell the truth,				
25	you're subject to perjury. Do you understand that?				

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

8/16/2020

1 A. Sure. Yeah.

Q. I'm going to be -- this is awkward doing this by video. I'm going to do the best I can to ask questions that are clear. It's particularly important especially since there's no other party represented that your answers -- that you understand the question before answering, that you don't speculate, don't guess.

You can -- you can tell me you don't know it and tell me why you don't know it. It's just important that you're very comfortable with the accuracy of your testimony. And if you don't understand my question, please just have me reframe it. Okay?

- A. Sure.
- Q. What's your current position with elections?
- 17 A. Say it again.
- Q. Are you involved in Athens-Clarke County elections?
- 20 A. Yes.
- Q. What is your role?
- A. I'm currently the chair of the County Board of Elections. Having said that, I'm not here representing the Board in any way, shape or form.
- 25 | I'm here representing myself as an individual.

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2.

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

Q. As an individual, can you just tell me a little bit about yourself, your background and what you do?

- A. You mean apart from the Board of Elections?
- Q. That's correct.
- A. I'm in my eighth year of teaching American government and civics in a local Title I public high school. I'm also the chair of, you know, a committee with GAE. I'm also chair of a local nonprofit that's focused on economic justice and voter registration and, you know, "get out the vote" efforts and elections integrity.
 - Q. What high school is it that you teach at?
 - A. Cedar Shoals High School.
 - Q. And where did you get your degree?
- A. My undergraduate degree, two majors and three minors, at the University of Louisville. The majors were philosophy and psychology. The minors, political science, history and Latin-American studies.

My graduate degree and my teaching certification comes from the University of Georgia. I received by Masters of Art in teaching with a concentration in social studies education, 6th through 12th, specializing in political science.

I also earned my reading endorsement while I 1 was earning my certificate in teaching. 2 Ο. And you have a newborn baby, I understand 3 also? 4 I do. He's seven months, a little over. 5 Α. I congratulate you. Ο. 6 7 Α. Thank you. How long have you been on the board of --Ο. 8 Athens-Clarke County Board of Elections? 9 I was sworn in, in -- well, January of 2017, 10 Α. I believe. My term started January 2017. 11 When you started, were you chairman? 12 Ο. 13 Α. No, no, no, no. Definitely not. Ο. When did you become chairman? 14 I became chairman like the beginning of my 15 Α. fourth year. My colleagues selected me to serve 16 as -- the majority of my colleagues selected me to 17 serve as chair in late January 2020 when the vote 18 took place. And my first session as chair was in 19 20 February of 2020. How are board members -- how do you get 2.1 appointed to be a board member? 2.2 Well, there are five positions on the board. 23 Three are nonpartisan positions and they are 2.4

appointed by a local commission.

25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

8/16/2020

Two of the positions are partisan. And the statute says -- the policy says something about, you know, whichever two -- yeah, whichever two parties has the majority of votes in a particular election cycle, that's who would determine -- you know, we're a two-party system in the United States. So that leaves the Republican and Democratic party as dominant -- the dominant party in the community right now.

So the local Republican party appointed one person and the local Democratic party appointed the other. And I'm not in a political party.

- Q. So you're one of the nonpartisan appointees; is that correct?
- A. That's correct. The mayor and commission had me go through an interview process and -- you know, with others. And they made the decision in late -- late 2016 and my term began January 2017.
- Q. About how much time do you spend with your Board of Elections work just per month roughly?
- A. Per month? That just depends on the month. I mean, if it's an election month, you know, there are several meetings around the time of the election, but also we -- you know, I've done like in June, I coordinated -- I designed, planned and coordinated

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

8/16/2020

like the delivery of all election equipment for Clarke County for that election. So that was a lot more time than I normally devote to the job.

I also, you know, do a lot of research with issues -- ongoing issues and speak to stakeholders between meetings and E-mail. And, you know, honestly it would be really hard for me to say, you know, a firm estimate.

I know our meetings tend to go -- usually our regular meetings go something like two or three hours. And, you know, sometimes we have a special meeting and it'll been a 30-minute meeting to an hour.

But I don't really -- I'd have to sit down and do the math to give you a firm estimate of something like that.

- Q. It's a major commitment of time, obviously.
- A. It definitely is a lot of time.
- Q. Let me drill down a little bit on what you said. You were describing your work with the board. And you said that you were responsible for the delivery and the installation of all equipment or something to that effect.

Can you explain that in a little bit greater detail?

2.

2.2

8/16/2020

A. Sure. When I was appointed or selected to be chair of the board, I was told by staff that the chairperson usually historically has had a huge -- a big role in ensuring that equipment is delivered to all the polling locations. So they were requesting my service for that.

And, you know, I said that's fine. And this particular year was more challenging than past years because this is the first year we've had our Dominion system, which is a lot more equipment. And we have 24 polling locations.

And, basically, I created a tentative, sort of a living document, a standard operating procedure -- excuse me -- procedure for loading the truck to ensure we can get to at least three different precincts -- I'm sorry. We use 24-foot, I believe -- 24-foot moving trucks and a trail vehicle if we need to, like a moving van actually is what we used this past go-around as a trail vehicle.

And so I basically had to design -- I designed the layout. I loaded it with a -- another person, like I did like a practice run of loading the truck and getting it -- as much equipment on there as possible in a way that's like stable and safe and effective for loading -- for moving the equipment to

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

24

25

Statement Under Oath
JESSE EVANS

8/16/2020

1 each polling location. So I've got an SOP for that;
2 I developed that.

And on the day I also coordinated with -over the phone and via phone calls, text and E-mail
with like people who would be our point of contact at
each location just to give them a heads-up that we're
coming and to check in with them as a reminder and
kind of get details about where our delivery
personnel should go and, you know, what time of day
and stuff like that.

And I also on the day -- so on the day of the moving -- the equipment moving, the load-out and getting it to the locations -- and, again, I coordinated the election day locations. I didn't coordinate advance voting. That's a less demanding task. There's less equipment for that and it's not -- because we delivered to all 24 polling locations in one day.

So on the day of moving we -- I sort of do -- I did a briefing in the morning with -- we've been using staff members from Athens-Clarke County Unified Government personnel, basically, for that. And I briefed them on routes.

I did a lot of planning and preparation for the routes. There were four different trucks,

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

24-foot moving trucks and I coordinated routes for that. And I trained personnel on those routes.

I had maps prepared for them, myself and -with directions and everything. And I also had
created a slide deck with aerial views of the
locations, so they would be more familiar with where
they were going and also had point of contact
information for those people -- for the driving crew,
the moving crew to use. And I had a communication
protocol that I -- that I provided to them.

And then, you know, they used my SOP, my diagram and the pictures and stuff I took of the fully-loaded truck that I did with the practice run to help them deliver. Oh, and I also created -- used -- created an inventory sheet with pictures of each thing, so people could know -- our personnel could know what they were looking at and how many they needed and stuff like that.

So we reviewed all that. And then during the day when they were loading out and leaving and stuff, they would text me that they were leaving.

And they got -- one of the roles that I had assigned that they chose, they -- each team had a person that was supposed to be communicating with me throughout.

And so they would tell me when they were

leaving, when they arrived. And I would give, you 1 know -- I was basically communicating with delivery 2. teams and with the point of contact at each location 3 to let them -- give them a heads-up that the delivery 4 team was on way. And I was also relaying information 5 to staff, ACC Board of Elections staff, about 6 7 progress. You know, we had four different area 8 managers and I was, you know -- and also there's one 9 person, a staff person over the entire like 10 facilities side of things, the elections side of 11 things, the equipment side of things. So I was 12 coordinating with her and the managers as well 13 14 throughout that process just to make sure that 15 everything went smoothly. And everything did go smoothly. I was 16 commended by staff. They had never seen anybody do 17 it the way I did it. But it was very well-organized 18 they said and it was very effective and they liked 19 what I did. 20 What election was that for? 2.1 Ο. June 2020. Α. 2.2. Do you have like a logistics background 2.3 Ο. training? 2.4 I was a commissioned officer in the U.S. 25 Α.

Army National Guard. Part of my training -- part of 1 my role -- well, I mean, your job as an officer is to 2. plan missions and to supervise and command those 3 missions. And, you know, there's a lot that goes 4 into it, the research and the reconnaissance and 5 coordination and delegation of tasks. 6 7 But, yes, so I have -- I've planned and coordinated large movements of very expensive 8 equipment, very sensitive equipment in the past. 9 What were the dates of your service in the 10 Ο. National Guard? 11 I honestly don't have that off the top of my 12 head, but it was back in -- so it was 2011 to 2015, 13 14 but I don't have the exact dates off the top of my head. 15 I want to shift gears a little bit and turn 16 your attention to ballot secrecy and the challenges 17 of protecting ballot secrecy using the ballot marking 18 device. 19 20 Are you with me, just the general topic? Α. Ballot secrecy? 2.1 Yes. Did that issue come up in Athens 2.2 Ο. during your tenure in the past -- in the past year? 23

the "past year," do you mean this current calendar

It actually came up -- well, when you say in

2.4

25

Α.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

| year or do you mean a year from now, like back.

- Q. Back. Yes, this calendar year.
- A. So just 2020 or 2020 all the way back to August 2019?
 - Q. When did it come up?

it all into the polling locations.

- A. Late 2019.
- Q. How did it come up?
- A. People in the community reaching out about it. And there was concern already about -- from staff -- this is well before we had any equipment -- that, you know, there was a lot more equipment. It was larger. And, you know, there was concern about, you know, storing it and also concern about fitting

So we knew there was going to be -- it was going to be a challenge to get all this new equipment set up and then -- period, but also in a way that -- well, ballot secrecy, there were people that reached out to us concerned about ballot secrecy. And I read in the media as well there were concerns about ballot secrecy in Georgia. And that kind of came from concerned community members and it came from the news media, really.

Q. How did the board approach the issue or how did you approach the issue? What did you do about it

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

or not do about it?

- A. And the issue you're saying is ballot secrecy -- maintaining ballot secrecy when utilizing the Dominion system?
 - Q. Exactly.
- A. So after receiving information from, you know, community members and seeing it in the paper and also receiving information from, I believe, a nonprofit organization that's dedicated to elections integrity, we -- we ended up as a board adopting a back-up plan just in case we couldn't -- and the back-up plan wasn't just about ballot secrecy. It was about whether or not we'd be able to utilize the Dominion system, the new system coming in, like in a way that meets our legal obligations and serves -- that would allow us to -- but also like practically speaking, physically speaking, could we use all the equipment that we've been asked to use?

So we need a plan B, what happens if there's something that goes wrong or we're not able to -- because it took a long time for us to get our equipment. We didn't even get our equipment until -- I believe it was February of 2020 when we got our equipment --

Q. Right.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

8/16/2020

1 A. -- and we had a March primary coming up.

Q. Right.

A. So we adopted -- we actually adopted as our back-up plan -- we just, you know, did some research.

And, again, there was media coverage of this.

We adopted Cobb County's pilot program that they utilized for hand-marked paper ballots. There was media coverage of that, like pilot success. And we wanted to have a back-up plan in place that would allow us to seamlessly transition to a back-up plan, something that was going to work and if for some reason we couldn't utilize the new electronic equipment that was coming in. So we adopted the Cobb County pilot program as our plan B.

- Q. And then you adopted the Cobb County pilot plan as plan B. That was before you actually started installing the new equipment; is that right?
- A. Oh, absolutely. We were -- there was a lot of uncertainty about the new equipment. We actually had just been told -- I believe it was at the same meeting, I believe. We were given an electrical survey, estimate or something. I forgot what they call it.

Basically, it was looking at our polling locations and looking at the demands that we had for

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

electricity for this new system, like number of circuits and things of that nature and the number of machines that are required per polling locations, meeting the one-per-250 rule.

And we were told at that meeting, I believe -- I want to say it was late January at a special-called meeting that the -- 18 out of 20 polling locations in Clarke County -- because we only had 20 at the time because we had some merge for construction reasons and other reasons.

But 18 out of the 20 at the time, we didn't -- did not have -- either didn't have current electrical capacity needed or they were unsure about it basically. So only two out of 20 election polling locations had been checked out and confirmed that they had electrical -- they met the electrical requirements of the new system. So that was a concern.

But also, you know, there had been complaints of -- in the media regarding ballot secrecy and complaints from community members who had seen the machines and had been concerned about the size of the screen and the angle of the screen and the size of the print and the lighting on the screen, basically, permitting people who were in the area --

for many people to see somebody else's voting 1 selections, which was a violation of ballot secrecy. 2. It was before we installed any equipment --3 and, actually, that led to us requesting -- you know, 4 these concerns led to us requesting that our staff, 5 our elections staff create at floor plan -- to-scale 6 7 floor plan of each polling location that showed where each machine would go, meeting the one-per-250 rule 8 but also the orientation of the machines as well. 9 we could have the -- the Board of Elections could 10 have confidence that this is possible -- you know, 11 that this was a possibility to set up all the 12 equipment in ways that did not violate ballot 13 secrecy. 14

- Q. And so in coming up with the back-up plan in late January, after doing that planning, then what happened?
- A. It was -- during the meeting when we adopted the plan -- the back-up plan, we received pushback from our director of elections, you know, for getting -- basically, it was clear that she didn't think that we should adopt it. She kept saying, We don't need to.

And the majority of the board didn't feel comfortable with what she was saying and given the

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

24

25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

facts that we knew at the time. And then actually after that, I followed up to ensure that we -- I needed to know how much -- like what equipment would be needed to implement plan B and how much of that equipment we had -- or materials we had on hand but also what we were lacking and when the purchase dates were.

And so I E-mailed our director of elections about that, cc'ing the board. And we ended up getting an estimate eventually regarding printing of ballots. And our elections director attempted to call a special meeting. Like normally -- so our bylaws say that the chair could call a special meeting as long as there's concurrence of two other board members, so we needed a quorum to do that.

But our director of elections actually tried to initiate her own special-called meeting. And in order to do that, she needed four members to vote yes to that.

And she was attempting to have us meet again and like it would seem it was to reconsider plan B that she had initially opposed to begin with. And the reason she said was because there's an estimate of money to be considered for printing the ballots and -- or the paper ballots.

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2.

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

And there was frustration expressed by board members about this because the board had made a decision and it seemed as though the director of elections in Clarke County was persisting in trying to dissuade the board -- basically, persuade the board not to have a plan B in place and, specifically, not to use the Cobb County pilot program as plan B.

But after conferring with board members, it was -- we were under the impression that, you know, we don't really need another special meeting -- a special-called meeting for that. We voted to have a plan B in place and that's what we wanted.

And, you know, there were election expenses every election cycle that were never -- the director of elections had never requested that we approve, you know, a certain dollar amount for anything like that, to my knowledge and to other board members' knowledge. So it was pretty obvious she was insisting upon a special meeting then.

So I actually spoke with assistant manager
Deborah Lonon who is the direct supervisor of
Director of Elections Charlotte Sosebee, Clarke
County and clarified the board's position on not
needing another like meeting for this, that we had

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

already made our decision.

This was after, you know, E-mail correspondence regarding this, after the board member who had proposed -- Mokah Johnson, after she had replied with -- to Director Sosebee's E-mail about this stuff and was expressing her frustration with Director Sosebee's sort of pushing back on the board and resisting doing what the board had decided to do.

And so, anyway, we spoke to Assistant

Manager Deborah Lonon about it. And then it was made
clear that we don't -- you know, so first of all,
four members didn't vote for -- like to confirm the
special meeting, but also there was E-mail
communication about there not being any need for
another meeting about that. And that was issued by
Deborah Lonon, assistant manager.

- Q. So plan B then was not at that point reconsidered by the board; is that right?
- A. No. Because we had already made the decision that we needed a back-up plan. We had never used this equipment. There were plenty of concerns: electrical concerns, space concerns, secrecy concerns. You know, so we wanted to have a back-up plan to be sure that we could do our elections in Clarke County we had coming up.

Ο. And this was for the then-March primaries; 1 correct? 2. Α. Correct. 3 And if my recollection is correct, the 4 voting actually began on the March primaries before 5 the pandemic suspended them; correct? 6 7 Α. Could you restate that? The voting started in March on the March Ο. 8 9 primaries; right? 10 Α. We had advance voting. How many weeks of advance voting did you 0. 11 have? 12 Oh, gosh, this is why I needed to be able to 13 look at my phone and get exact days. I want to say 14 it was three, but I'd have to double check --15 Q. Days or weeks? 16 Weeks. Α. 17 But how many actually -- how many days of 18 voting occurred, just roughly, before the primary was 19 20 postponed? Well, that's, again, a good question because 2.1 I'd have to check those dates as well. I can tell 2.2 you that the week of the first Tuesday in March, so I 23 guess March 3rd, I think, is when it was. 2.4 Can I look at my phone real quick --25

Q. Sure, sure. 1 -- and confirm these dates? Α. 2. MR. BROWN: Sure. 3 (Brief pause.) 4 THE WITNESS: Yeah. So March 3rd was 5 the day we had a regular meeting for Board 6 7 of Elections. And the day prior to that was the first day of early voting. 8 So, you know -- and then I went to the 9 Board of Elections' office, which was --10 that was the first day of early voting and 11 that was the only site that was set up at 12 that time for that week -- and just doing 13 the normal Board of Elections stuff, 14 15 checking out polling locations and saying "hi" to people, checking on the progress, 16 the first time we'd used the Dominion 17 18 system. We had concerns about --19 20 BY MR. BROWN: Let me interrupt you right there. 2.1 I'm going to focus on some things. 2.2 So early voting started at one location on 23 March 2nd; correct? 2.4 Yeah. At the downtown Board of Elections Α. 25

1 office.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

20

2.1

2.2

- Q. Were you using BMDs or did you invoke your back-up plan?
- A. No. We tried to use the BMDs. We tried to use the electronic system. We received assurances from Director Sosebee that -- you know, multiple times. We would ask for like a diagram or a plan or something to show that the machines could be set -- this new equipment could be set up in a way that would protect ballot secrecy and, you know, meet the one-per-250 rule and all that.

She had to -- like she said that we didn't need to have any sort of to-scale floor plans for early voting, that there would be no problems with that. She agreed, I want to say at the February meeting -- the February regular meeting -- she'd provide us --

(Reporter requests witness slow down.)

19 BY MR. BROWN:

- Q. Let me ask you just -- if you could focus on my questions...(audio fades).
 - A. I can't hear you, Bruce.
- Q. What I need to get from you, if you'll just sort of follow along, is just some of the structure of this. And if I want more detail, I'll ask you.

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

Statement Under Oath JESSE EVANS

8/16/2020

1 Early voting started on March 2nd; correct?

- A. Yes.
- Q. You were using BMDs on March 2nd; right?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And, at some point, did you need to invoke plan B, in other words, using hand-marked ballots?
 - A. Yes. On March 3rd we did that.
 - Q. And then why did you do that on March 3rd?
- A. Because -- well, for multiple reasons, one of which was when I visited the early voting location at the downtown office on March 2nd, I went and I was speaking with staff in the area where staff works behind the partition between public and staff.

And when I was talking to staff, one of the voting -- the BMD screens actually caught my eye on the right of me. You could see through the -- at the looking glass -- at the set partition glass that separates staff from public and you could see the screen, the BMD screen. And that's a violation of ballot secrecy.

And another reason was that on March 3rd when we met, we had been previously -- we had been promised in February, we were told by Director Sosebee that she would provide to us, have staff provide to us to-scale floor plans for all election

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2.

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

day voting locations and that would actually be provided prior to March 3rd and that was never done.

And on March 3rd when we showed up, they didn't have to-scale floor plans showing that we could execute that election with all the equipment required meeting the one-per-250 rule and utilizing all the equipment while maintaining ballot secrecy. They just didn't, staff didn't provide that for the board.

And the board had lost confidence because we had been reassured repeatedly that we could do that. Specifically, we were told that they could accomplish that with advance voting at the downtown office. And then in the one instance where we -- the equipment had been set up and they said it was not a worry, not an issue, it was going to be protected -- ballot secrecy was going to be protected, it like didn't -- it wasn't protected. It was violated. Well, the setup was violating ballot secrecy. People could just see the screen of the BMD.

Also that wasn't the only concern. The BMDs at the advance voting location, they had been set up side by side next to each other. And in order to get to the BMD that was furthest away, voters had to walk past the closest BMD to get to the next BMD. And you

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

24

25

8/16/2020

could see the screen as they were -- they could see the other voters' voting screens as they were walking past to get to their BMD. So the setup was not protecting ballot secrecy in that way either.

- Q. So when you invoked plan B with respect to the early voting location, did you stop using the BMDs that were there and started using hand-marked paper ballots?
- A. To my knowledge, at least one BMD was maintained like in use. But, yeah, they had switched over to -- to the paper ballots.
- Q. How did the switchover to paper ballots go? Was that relatively easy?
- A. To my knowledge, yes. I didn't hear complaints from the public about it as far as, you know, like them not liking using paper ballots. I didn't hear a lot of complaints about that.

I think that there was definitely, you know, concerns expressed from some members of the public prior to -- when the decision-making was being done at the March 3rd meeting, but that was not about the process of transitioning. That was just some people basically bothered about the board's decision.

There were some people speaking in favor of the board making the decision to switch to plan B and

some people speaking against the decision to switch 1 to plan B. But as far as executing plan B, I didn't 2. hear really many complaints. The only complaint I 3 heard was that sometimes staff or poll workers 4 would -- when a voter would go in to turn in their --5 to scan their BMD -- or their ballot -- and this was 6 7 happening with the BMDs, too, some poll workers were -- for some reason I was told some poll workers 8 were asking voters to put it in face up instead of 9 face down. 10 But that was a concern. We discussed the 11 concern about that, the board members and I did. And 12 to my knowledge, they stopped doing that at that 13 14 location. Let me back up a little bit just to make 15 sure that the record is clear. 16 You mentioned the one-to-250 rule a couple 17 of times. You said one to 250. Is that the rule 18 that requires at least one ballot station for every 19 20 250 voters in particular precincts? Is that what you're referring to? 2.1 Yes. And that applies to election day not 2.2 advance voting. 2.3 Thank you. Okay. So moving forward a 2.4 Ο. little bit, the voting for the March primary at some 25

7

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

point then was suspended and the election day for the
primary day was moved off a couple of times,
actually; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And then -- so you stopped the early voting

- Q. And then -- so you stopped the early voting in Athens. Then what happened with respect to the plan B?
- A. I don't remember. Actually, it was prior to the -- prior to the voting for the March primary being pushed back but put on pause and pushed back due to the pandemic, we were actually -- the Georgia State Elections Board called an emergency hearing regarding our decision to utilize plan B for our community.
 - Q. The Board of Elections was challenging that decision; correct?
 - A. The State Elections Board did challenge our decision. They wanted -- they had a hearing. And the hearing was to -- it was regarding the decision. And all indications were that they were in opposition.
 - Q. Let me try to get back on track here then.

 So the sequence was that the secretary of state weighed in while the primary was still going on; correct?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

Statement Under Oath JESSE EVANS

8/16/2020

A. Yeah.

Q. And then what did you do? Did you change the way the voting was going on prior to the hearing or did you wait for the hearing or what did you do?

A. We relayed to them what we were doing and we wanted the State Elections Board to hear the reasoning and to hear from our attorneys that we hired regarding the practicability of utilizing the voting machines, the voting system to meet this one-per-250 rule and also meet the statutes -- the constitutional requirement and the federal and state requirements, statutory requirements that we protect absolute ballot secrecy; and also the requirement that the equipment -- voting equipment should be able to be monitored at all times, monitored by staff, poll workers at all times while in use.

So we -- you know, the three of us, the majority of us who voted on March 3rd for a plan B also, you know, wanted to make sure that our concerns and our case and our perspective was put forth with the elections board. And so we definitely didn't change like our decision prior to the hearing and we only did after the hearing because we were under threat of fines.

The hear -- the board -- the State Elections

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

24

25

8/16/2020

Board decided against our decision to enact plan B and to utilize plan B. And they, you know, issued a -- I want to say it was a \$2,500 fine, but also they issued their -- in their decision they said that it would be even more costly for us if we continued to utilize absentee ballots -- or, excuse me, the hand-marked paper ballots. So that very next day after that emergency hearing, the voters in our county were back to using the electronic ballot marking devices.

Q. And then did the Athens-Clarke County Board come up with a resolution or something as to how it was going to conduct the elections going forward after the Board of Elections hearing?

A. Yes. So during the process of preparation for the hearing, our attorneys received a concession from the secretary of state office's attorney. It was an interpretation of the one-per-250 rule that we had not been provided up to that point and, basically, saying that it was one voting booth per 250 people rather than one ballot marking device for 250 people.

So that was factored into a new board policy but also other things like best practices that had been observed in other counties, one incorporated

into the new policies. And the policy was drafted by 1 our attorneys who had represented us in this SEB 2. emergency hearing and it was approved by the board on 3 April 1st, 2020. 4 (Exhibit 1 marked for identification.) 5 BY MR. BROWN: 6 7 Let me -- if you would look at what we have marked as Evans Exhibit 1, which is -- I'll represent 8 9 to you is the document that you E-mailed to us 10 shortly before your statement today. Do you see that on the screen? 11 I do. Α. 12 This particular copy is not signed, but it 13 was -- your recollection is that this was document 14 15 that was signed by the board on or about April 1st, 2020? 16 Yes. The only difference is that there was 17 a typo on the top of page 3 that's no longer there. 18 There was a typo on that day that we signed. 19 20 Ο. And but the board should have the actual signed resolution; correct? 21 Α. Yes. 2.2 But just going through the substance of this 23 0. resolution, let me sort of work backwards on this. 2.4 Is this the current up-to-date resolution 25

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

8/16/2020

1 that would govern the subject matter or has this in 2 turn been revised?

- A. There's been no revision.
- Q. Did Athens-Clarke County when it set up for the June 11th and for the -- wait, the June 9th primary and then for the August 11 run-offs follow, basically, the procedures and policy that's set forth in Evans Exhibit 1?
- A. I'm going to turn off my camera and pull up the document on my phone, so I can go down through it with you. Okay?
 - Q. Okay.
- A. So staff training -- or poll worker training was provided leading up to the June 9th, 2020 election. And I took part in one of those and I also sat in on another, like virtually.

And staff was actually -- they like mentioned the policy, but they didn't actually go through it line by line, you know. And they just said, We've provided this to you. And they sort of -- it was presented as an option, as a guide, not as "this is what should be done."

And I'll also say that, you know, throughout this whole process, there had been pushback from staff regarding the board taking action to ensure

ballot secrecy like, for example, with the floor 1 I, you know, personally -- well, actually, 2. during the SEB hearing, staff promised -- because 3 during that SEB emergency hearing staff had still not 4 provided us -- the board directly those -- the 5 to-scale drawings. And the ones that they provided 6 7 to our attorneys for the purposes of the hearing were like not sufficient. They did not show that one for 8 250 and ballot secrecy rules were being met. 9 But it was said under sworn statement --10 sworn testimony by a staff member from ACC Board of 11 Elections that they would have that to the board the 12 following week and that never happened. 13 So there's been like a resistance to -- from 14 staff on following through and doing what the board 15 has asked staff to do regarding preservation of 16 ballot secrecy. 17 I actually met with -- like staff asked me 18 to meet with staff to help them like with the 19 20 to-scale floor plans and with understanding what they should be -- people should be doing -- like poll 2.1 workers should be doing to implement the policy that 2.2 the board had adopted on April 1st. 2.3 Let me interrupt you there just to sort of 2.4 cut to the chase. 25

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

On the June 9th election, did Athens-Clarke County have enough BMDs in the polling locations to meet the one-to-250 requirement?

A. I guess that depends on what you mean by did they have them in the polling locations. I personally observed in one of the polling locations that while the equipment had been dropped off, that there were actually fewer -- like some of the equipment was never taken out the case and it wasn't set up to be utilized by voters.

And also they didn't -- that poll manager hadn't put up any tables and voting booths for hand-marked paper ballots to make up the difference between the number of BMDs that were set up and the required number of voting booths for that station -- polling location.

- Q. Okay. So at least you can say that certainly not all of the polling locations had BMDs or ballot stations deployed sufficient to meet the one-to-250 requirement; correct?
- A. That's correct. Only after I called Director Sosebee and spoke to her about it later that day -- after witnessing this, I called our director of elections and spoke to her about it. And I came back later that day and there were tables set up, you

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

know, like -- basically, there were tables set up

just to meet the one-to-250 rule, but they weren't

being utilized. And they were like not in the voting

area where voters were actually -- I mean, they were

in the voting area, but they weren't -- it was clear

they weren't actually intended to be used. It was

just to meet the one-to-250 rule.

- Q. If they had been used, it would have been for hand-marked paper ballots; right?
 - A. Correct.
- Q. Now, in the polling locations was ballot secrecy preserved by the positioning of the ballot marking devices in an effective way?
- A. Again, we had the problem where people were walking -- like people would walk behind voters in the voting booths to get to their voting booth and they could see the screen that way.

Also our policy that the board adopted said if there are polling machines side by side, they should have extended dividers to protect -- you know, to prevent people from being able to see the BMDs screens of other voters. And those were not put in place to protect ballot secrecy.

Q. We're talking about the June election right now, but I can probably expand it to other elections.

2.

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

In terms of based upon your experience -and you've had a lot of hands-on experience both as
the chairman but also your experience of unloading
this equipment and planning all the logistics -- is
it feasible for Athens-Clarke County, given the
polling locations that it has available, to both meet
the one-and-250 requirement and use only BMDs
throughout?

- A. Umm...
- Q. You mentioned some things that sound like problems in execution, right, like if you did it better, you might be able to do it. Okay?

But even if you did a good job with the screen separators, with the floor plans, if you did that, could you preserve ballot secrecy and match one BMD for every 250 electors into your existing polling locations?

A. From what I've seen, it would not -- like that would not be the case for all polling locations. And also I'd have to say like to this date -- to this date right now, when we're speaking right now, we have not -- the board has still not received like to-scale floor plans, like a finalized draft to show that we can do this. And staff has said -- communicated that it's really hard to fit this many

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

machines in there to begin with but also to do it while protecting ballot secrecy.

So we still don't have -- you know, months and months later -- what is it, six months later? Or five months later? Yeah, five months later. We still -- the board still has not been presented with a finalized copy of to-scale floor plans for all 24 polling locations that show we can do one per 250 with BMDs -- with all BMDs.

- Q. Based upon your knowledge of the polling locations, is the problem that the staff is just not doing their homework or the homework cannot be done, if you know what I'm saying?
- A. Honestly, it could be both. I know there definitely has been resistance from staff on just implementing this. But also like a poll manager had seen a draft of the floor plan and when I had shown up -- this is same poll manager, the same location, the one that had a lot of machines still in the suitcases, again, the carrying cases. That poll manager expressed to me like they did not feel like they could actually set up all that equipment according to that floor plan. They couldn't actually set it all up that way.
 - Q. Going back a little bit to just a broader

question. Based upon your hands-on experience of 1 loading the equipment, all the logistics involved in 2. setting up the equipment, your efforts in trying to 3 have your staff develop floor plans that attempted to 4 protect privacy but also meet the numerosity 5 requirement, the one-and-250 requirement -- based 6 7 upon all that experience, what would -- why wouldn't you switch to hand-marked paper ballots? 8 I mean, at this point it's -- it's basically 9 10 a result of the DEB hearing -- emergency hearing. Like we thought we were doing the right thing. We 11 still felt we were doing the right thing back in 12 13 March when we were attempting to protect ballot secrecy by using our back-up plan, but then -- and 14 15 our attorney presented very compelling evidence. Our attorneys did a great job, made it very clear with 16 photographic evidence, with like witness testimony, 17 with -- you know, even with their way -- they did 18 cross-examination of state's witnesses. 19 20 And at the end of the day, it didn't matter. It did not matter. The SEB was like -- they found 2.1 against it. They said that we -- they didn't agree 2.2 with the decision. And they issued a fine and it 2.3 would be an even harsher fine or an even harsher 2.4 penalty if we didn't switch over immediately back 25

| to --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

24

25

Q. Let me do this and I'm -- the purpose of the question wasn't to assign blame for you not walking into a bunch of fines. That's not -- that wasn't the thrust of it.

But what I want to do is separate -- there are bureaucratic and legalistic reasons why you would not want to go directly to hand-marked paper ballots, specifically the Board of Elections is going to get punished by the State Elections Board. Are you with me?

- A. Yes.
- Q. I'm going to call those bureaucratic and punitive reasons for not switching from ballot marking devices to hand-marked paper ballots.

Are you with me?

- 17 A. Yes.
 - Q. Apart from those concerns, could the Board of Elections -- could Athens deploy hand-marked paper ballots and protect voter privacy, meet the logistical requirements of getting prepared to vote with hand-marked paper ballots?
 - A. So I asked a similar question of the staff, like I sent an E-mail requesting information about, you know, what if, you know, the secretary of

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

state -- what if they decide that everyone's going to hand-marked paper ballots, could we handle that?

Could we do that?

And the staff's response was, We'll do whatever is required of us to do. We'll figure out how to do it. Basically, it was yes. If that's what we were told to do, we would do it and we would manage it.

- Q. Based upon your experience and your sort of working knowledge of the various ways of voting, would you have any particular concerns about switching to hand-marked paper ballots?
- A. I mean, the only things -- for one, it would be a longer time to process the elections. That's not necessarily a reason not to do it. That's just an effect of switching over. Right?
 - Q. Right.
- A. It would take longer to process those -- you know, that many paper ballots.

And, two, back in June we had about 16,000 absentee -- paper absentee ballots sent in like by voters in our county. And one issue that came up was that our voter review panel actually discovered that there were marks being made by voters on these paper ballots but that the Dominion scanner -- or the

scanner being used by the Dominion system that we 1 were using to scan the ballots and the software we 2 were using for adjudication -- the software we were 3 using for adjudication wasn't counting marks that 4 are to the human eye, to the voter review panel's 5 eyes, were clearly votes cast -- like they meant to 6 7 be cast. They weren't counting all those if they were 8 9 below a certain like bubble coverage threshold. 10 settings I believe were anything less than 12 percent, it would not be counted as ambiguous. So it 11 wouldn't be flagged to be seen by a voter review 12 panel. But like it would just never be -- you know, 13 it would just never have human eyes on it, basically, 14 15 to see that it was a vote. Mr. Evans, I'm going to address that 16 17

separate. Okay? That's another issue on the scanning thing that I want to talk to you about.

But just in terms of setting up the -- your polling places for election day, your staff said, Sure, you can switch to hand-marked paper ballots. It may take a little bit longer to process the hand-marked paper ballots.

And why is that? Don't the voters scan those just like they scan their BMD-generated

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

24

25

| ballots?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

2.4

25

- A. They -- so in my experience with the hand-marked paper ballots -- or you're saying like at the actual -- you're saying on the election day itself not using -- because I was referring to the processing of absentee by mail.
- Q. No, no. I meant -- I'm talking about election day -- election day. And let's say for some reason you can't use BMDs. Are you with me?
 - A. Yeah.
- Q. Would deploying hand-marked paper ballots instead of BMDs be relatively easy?
 - A. Yeah. I don't see why it wouldn't be.
- "Yes" is the answer. I don't see why. We were doing it back in March and it was fine. So I don't know why it would be any different in November.
- Q. And we talked about ballot secrecy and about one to 250 and about the power requirements and many people hiding behind the booth, all the different constraints that you have.

How does the need to socially distance voters and poll workers have an impact upon the feasibility of using the ballot marking devices?

A. You can only have a certain number of people in the room. There's a maximum of, I believe,

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2.

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

1 | 10 people in the room and that's including poll workers.

So I think it was -- basically at the polling locations it was you're only allowed to have three or four voters come through at a time. And they are coming in in waves or in shifts or whatever. And they'd have to be spread out throughout the room as well.

And, you know, there's the sanitizing of the equipment before voters get in there. There's the sanitizing of the equipment after voters have used it between each wave of voters -- of three or four voters coming through. So it slows things down dramatically and it would lead to -- I mean, like in June it wasn't -- we didn't see long lines in June. But in November if this is still going on, it's going to be a much higher turnout. June was primaries mostly, but -- with some local stuff here, too. But, you know, in November it's going to be a much higher turnout.

So it would affect voting lines. It would affect how long people have to wait and how many votes are being done in one polling location at the time or in a day.

Q. Right. And would it speed things up to have

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

hand-marked paper ballots?

- A. Well, yeah, because you wouldn't have to sanitize the equipment.
 - Q. Right.
- A. Also some counties -- I've heard of some places using like drive-through or drive-up voting like outdoor voting. We had a voter recently in Clarke County send me an E-mail asking me about are we going to be able to do -- could we possibly do voting outside in a covered space or something. But if we're using BMDs, like we'd have to have electrical capacity, electrical set-up. We'd have to have it done in a way that's going to protect the machines from the elements.
 - Q. Right.
- A. But, you know, with paper ballots you don't run into that. You just have tables set up outside in a covered area and people would come and vote. You don't have all the electrical requirements.
- So, yeah, you wouldn't have -- it's also new equipment. People have to get the card at the poll pad and then go use the card at the machine and scroll through and then print it out -- like once their done, hit "submit," print it out and then go over to the scanner and scan it in after --

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

hopefully, after they've confirmed. Gone to our station where people can use magnifying glasses and confirm that what's on the paper is what selected in the machine.

So it's going to be fewer steps in the process and we have more options when it comes to voting outside and stuff if we went to paper as well. It would be faster, I think.

Q. Let me switch gears -- thank you for that.

Let me switch gears a little bit to just a very few questions on one issue.

And that is for absentee -- completed absentee ballots, somebody has completed their absentee ballot, doesn't want to put in the United States Postal Service for obvious reasons.

In Athens-Clarke County, where can they come drop it off if they don't want to use the mail?

A. We have five -- currently, we have five absentee ballot drop boxes that have been strategically set throughout our community -- set up throughout our community for ease of access. We dispersed them in various parts of town that we know that people have access to and they know where it is and it's, you know, closer -- we don't have it all centralized. It's all spread out so people can have

3

12

13

14

15

16

17

20

2.1

2.2

25

8/16/2020

1 access to it and it's closer to their home.

- Q. Will you allow them to drop it off at polling locations --
- No. No. That's -- we were told -- we've 4 been told by staff that that's not something that 5 we're doing. We're not -- and I'm not sure if 6 7 that's -- I think -- I want to say it was the -- it's definitely the director saying this. It's on our 8 website. Right now you can go check it out and see 9 on our website that absentee ballots cannot be turned 10 in at polling locations. 11
 - So we're not offering that right now. And, again, that was at the insistence of our elections director.
 - Q. Let me direct your attention to the scanning issue, the sensitivity of the scanning. You actually mentioned it when we were talking about the ballots.

Were you on the vote review board for this last election?

- A. The August election?
- Q. Yes.
 - A. Yes. I was.
- Q. What is the vote review board just in qeneral?
 - A. The vote review panel, it's a group of

community members and -- that were, you know, either 1 appointed by the board or, you know, there are some 2 that are appointed by both local parties, the 3 Republican Party and the Democratic Party locally. 4 There's a couple that are appointed by a judge. 5 However, this last time around it was just me 6 7 representing the board and then a Democratic Party appointee and a Republican Party appointee. 8 were only three of us there. 9 10 And -- and the job is -- consists basically of, you know, if there's a ballot that's been 11 duplicated, one piece of the job is to look at the 12 duplications and make sure that the duplicate matches 13 the intent of the voter on the original ballot. 14 that's part of it. 15 But the other piece of it is adjudicating 16 ballots, you know, making sure that if the voter has 17 made a mark on the ballot that -- and that mark can 18 be, you know -- the vote review panel determines that 19 20 that mark is actually an intentional attempt at voting and the intent of the voter is clear, it can 2.1 be discerned by the vote review panel, then than mark 2.2 is accepted as a vote by that voter. 2.3 Let me back up just a little bit. 2.4 Q.

(Audio fades) -- ballots duplicated?

25

Α. Sometimes there's damage to the ballot, the 1 Sometimes it's, you know, because the paper ballot. 2. way the voter marked the ballot like --3 Spilt coffee --4 Q. Α. Say again? 5 Somebody spilled coffee on it and it won't Ο. 6 7 go through the scanner; that kind of thing? Yeah. Basically, if it's going to be an 8 issue with the scanner. 9 10 Ο. Let me move into the adjudication of ballots. 11 Now, who or what, I should say probably, 12 13 decides what ballots are supposed to be adjudicated 14 or need to be adjudicated? 15 Α. Well, now under this new system it's a software that determines which ballots are to be 16 adjudicated. 17 And so it will give -- the software then 18 will give who the vote -- or separate for the 19 20 voter review panel to review a set of ballots that needs to be adjudicated; is that right? 2.1 There are certain parameters that Yeah. 2.2

are -- like certain settings for the software, the

adjudication software for this new system. And if

there's -- I think there's seven or eight different

2.3

2.4

25

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2.

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

criteria that could be checked, you know, could be implemented to kick ballots back to the vote review panel for adjudication. The state, apparently, I'm told by staff, only trained people to use four of those options even though it's possible to use the others.

And also it has to do with the amount of ink or the amount of coverage of the bubble. You know, if it's above -- if it was below -- if it's between 12 percent and I want to say like 32 or 34, I forget the exact number -- maybe 30. Yeah, I forget. But it's 12 and 30 something percent -- that that would be counted not as a vote but as an ambiguous mark. If anything's over that upper limit of that ambiguous mark range, that would be counted as a vote. Anything less than that lower limit, the threshold, that would not be counted as a vote and would not be counted as ambiguous needing to be reviewed by the vote review panel. And also, basically, nobody -- no human eyes would ever necessarily be on that.

- Q. If it's below, say, 12 percent, it gets rejected without any human intervention; correct?
- A. It -- yeah. There's -- it's not counted as a vote. And there's no -- and it's not presented to human eyes, you know, to identify the intent -- to

try to identify the intent of the voter. 1 When a ballot gets into the -- I'll just say 2 the adjudication queue, the batch that needs to be 3 reviewed by the vote review panel. 4 The ballot will have many different races on 5 it; correct? 6 7 Α. It depends on the election but, yes. In June it did. 8 And so --9 Ο. Α. 10 In August it did not. It was a runoff. So if there's a single ambiguous vote on Ο. 11 there, it would kicked out for adjudication, correct, 12 or put aside for adjudication; right? 13 Ambiguous is one of the settings, yeah. 14 15 Ambiguous and overvote. Ο. And overvote, right. 16 Α. And there were two more settings that I can 17 find and tell you what they, if you'd like. 18 MR. BROWN: Yeah. If you could do that 19 20 quickly, that's be great. Hey, Bruce, can we take a 2.1 THE REPORTER: quick bathroom break? 2.2 MR. BROWN: Let's take a break right 23 2.4 now.

(Recess from 3:31 p.m. to 3:43 p.m.)

25

8/16/2020

BY MR. BROWN:

Q. Mr. Evans, we're back on the record.

Have you seen floor plans that give you confidence that in light of the other constraints, including the requirement of one BMD for every 250 voters or one ballot station for every 250 voters, that voter privacy, that ballot secrecy can be protected without using hand-marked paper ballots at some or all of your polling locations?

- A. I have not seen floor plans like you've just described.
- Q. Thank you. Let's move on to -- go back to the vote review panel, which we were talking about right before we broke. And to get us back on track, you were describing four different -- you had said before that there were seven or eight criteria that could be used by the software -- the adjudication software, that the state uses four options and that two of the options were ambiguous votes, which were votes which were cast -- which votes had some -- I'm sorry, ballots that had some votes that were between 12 percent and 33 percent. That's one category.

And then overvotes. We know what overvotes are. That's when someone votes for more than one person for the same race; correct?

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

A. Yes. It's overvote and ambiguous mark.

Q. Okay.

A. And also the other two that were utilized in June and also in August in our county was the blank ballot and the write-in. Those four settings were utilized with the software.

The ones we did not use were blank contest, undervote and write-in for qualified candidates.

- Q. What's write-in for qualified candidates?
- A. Great question. That was never explained to us. It was just -- we were just told it was a write-in. "Qualified" was in parenthesis. But like we didn't use those.

Actually, in Georgia, blank contest and undervote are going to be actually the same. Like it's going to pull up the same contest because we don't have ranked voting in this state.

- Q. So if somebody doesn't vote on a race, it just counts what it counts and you never see it?
- A. To be more precise, if the software doesn't recognize a mark as a vote and the software doesn't recognize a mark as an ambiguous mark, then the vote review panel -- it's not flagged for adjudication by the vote review panel.

However, our vote review panel back in June

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

when looking at the ballots that were -- did have at 1 least one contest flagged for adjudication noticed 2. that there were other contests that were not flagged 3 for adjudication but also had marks that were not 4 counted as votes, but there was a mark there and it 5 was -- the voter's intent was clear. And had they --6 7 you know, had they not seen that ballot due to the contest that was flagged for adjudication, then that 8 would have never been seen. 9

- Q. When you were doing the vote review panel work, did you see ballots that featured that combination of -- like one ambiguous vote that kicked it into ballot review board review but then also other marks that didn't counted at all?
- A. So I -- so in August, there was only one race on the ballot.
 - Q. Okay.
 - A. So the answer would have to be no on that.

In June, members of the public could actually -- we had a glass window where people could actually look into the room -- the secured room where the voter review panel was doing adjudication. And I did see in June, you know, several -- you know, many -- like there were many ballots in which one contest on the ballot was flagged for adjudication,

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

24

25

8/16/2020

but there were other contests on the ballot that were not flagged for adjudication but also the mark that had been made on that was not counted as a vote and like -- but to the human eye, the voter's intent was very clear.

And, actually, our vote review panel then that I was not a part of back in June, they did account those marks as votes.

- Q. Was any effort in June made to go back and review ballots that may have had some races that were not counted but that were not adjudicated because they did not trigger any of the software criteria for adjudication?
- A. Yeah. Actually, members of the board that I'm on, the Board of Elections, we were thinking if we were missing anything less than 12 -- like marks less than 12 percent that were not on a ballot where anything was flagged for adjudication, if we're missing those marks and we have technological capability to change the settings on the software, the adjudication software to count undervotes and blank contests, then -- if we want to capture, if we want to know and go see and try to identify and hopefully count as a vote, if we're legally permitted to do, a mark on the ballot that wasn't picked up --

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

marked as an ambiguous mark by the software and wasn't flagged -- or marked as a -- or counted as a vote, we could do it that way.

But when we asked our staff -- our director of elections if we could do that and we asked our attorney if we could do that, we were told by both that we were not allowed to do that, that we were not allowed to change the settings on the adjudication software to hopefully -- you know, and that way to find the votes that were not counted and not shown to the vote review panel.

- Q. Has that issue been pursued further by the board or by the lawyers, if you know?
- A. Yeah. Like interestingly and frustrating enough, we were advised -- we were told that earlier in -- so in June, that the week after the elections when we were coming in for -- like to do special called meetings and try to handle this issue, we were told early in the week that we couldn't do it. But then we find out later in the week that the county next door actually did do that.

And then on -- on the day that we were to certify the election -- scheduled to certify the election in June, one of our attorneys -- apparently the attorney that spoke to the secretary of state's

office and spoke to their attorney then tells us, Oh, 1 well, actually, by the way, yes, I did tell you this 2. earlier this week, but, you know, between then and 3 now I've spoken with them again and now they've 4 backed off that statement saying that -- you know, 5 like the idea that we're not permitted to change the 6 7 settings on the adjudication software. So what's the current -- what's true now? 8 9 Are you able --10 Α. That's a good question. We have asked -- so we asked again. We were going to try to include 11 those things in August. We were going to try to 12 13 include those settings to avoid that issue, just make sure we're not leaving -- like if a voter casts a 14 vote in Clarke County, you know, it's cast. We can 15 count it. 16 And we were told again by our attorney 17

And we were told again by our attorney that -- by one of our attorneys that we can't do that, it would be in violation of, you know, laws and -- certain laws.

Q. At the county level, the county does not have the discretion to change either the criteria for either ballot review panel -- vote review, panel review or the percentages that were deemed to be an ambiguous vote; is that right?

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

We've been told that we can't do Α. Yeah. 1 either of those things. And then when I asked, Like 2. would you show me -- and actually another board 3 member asked, Would you show me where it's written 4 that we can't do this? 5 The attorneys said, Well, I can't show you 6 in statute because it's not written in statute. 7 But I can say that, you know, the way laws are 8 interpreted, you know, that were written -- this is 9 implied, basically, is what the attorney said. 10 And then, you know, they said -- the 11 attorneys told us that if we decided to do this, it 12 would probably be challenged. We're setting 13 ourselves up for another challenge from the State 14 Elections Board. 15 If they fine again --16 Ο. Α. Say it again. I'm sorry. 17 With the threat that you'll get fined again. 18 Q. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But also like, you know, Α. 19

we were told, Well -- you know, because after I

pushed back and said, Didn't you tell us that you

called back and they said that they backed off that?

And she said, Yes, you're right, I did say

that. And then they said, Well, until we receive

very clear directive and quidance from the State

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

Elections Board that we can do this, I'm advising you not to do this. This was in a regular public meeting that they said this.

- Q. So the default then is that you can't change either the criteria or the settings unless you're given affirmative authority to do so from the State Elections Board; correct?
- A. That's what we're being advised by both our attorney and also by our director of elections.

And even further I would like to -- I want to know like if we can actually like -- okay, we can't go back and do this with VRP, right, voter review panel, but what we could do is create a new project in Dominion, right, and like set the settings to only like over -- sorry, undervote and blank contest. Right? And these are the settings that we didn't use last time, you know. And then we can have the adjudication software -- set those ballots from the previous election aside. Right? And we could go through visually.

And even though it's already done, we can at least have an idea of -- the election's already done, we can at least have an idea of what are we missing with this software? What -- how many votes -- marks that would have been votes, that should have been

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

votes, how many are we actually missing?

So I brought that idea to my elections director and she said it would be illegal for us to do that. We don't have permission to do that.

- O. Not even to do like a mock run of it?
- A. Yeah. Just to go back after the fact and look at the -- you know, what the software would give us even if it's not a part of the official adjudication process or it's not part of the official certification of elections process, we still -- like she said we can't do it period.

She hasn't pointed to any statute or rule that says that, but that's what she said to us -- like to me we can't -- like that would be in violation of the law if we were to do that.

Q. I don't want to get into the sort of personal dynamics between the board and the elections director.

But let me just ask this. Can the board just say, Tough, do it?

A. Sure. We could. We could like make a decision and say, yes, we're going to do this. But with the way things have gone earlier this year with -- when we tried to protect the ballot secrecy by switching to plan B and the way the SEB handled it

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

and the way our elections staff and our attorney here locally handled it, it doesn't -- you know, it's not likely to happen --

- Q. So I take it --
- A. -- as far as votes go. I don't know that we'd have -- I don't think we'd have the number of votes needed to do something like that.
- Q. Is it fair to say that there's not a whole lot of curiosity from either your director of elections or the state board or the lawyers as to the impact these settings might have upon actually disenfranchising voters?
- A. I've not seen -- like I've not seen evidence of that sort of curiosity from any of those parties.

 And I've seen our board try to figure this out and then I've seen our board get pushback from our local attorney and our local elections director.
- Q. Does it seem like your local attorney and your elections director are sort of a proxy for the State Elections Board?
- A. You know, honestly, I don't -- I couldn't say that about my local attorney, but there are times that I do wonder that about our elections director. She's employed by our local government, but many times throughout my tenure on the board, it seemed

that --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

Q. Let me move on to another somewhat related topic.

Now, the public is able to see the decisions that the review panel is making while they're making it? Are they like looking over your shoulder or looking across the room? How does that work?

A. The room that they're in are two entrances and one of those entrances opens up into a hallway. The other entrance opened up into our facility where we store machines and equipment and stuff.

But the hallway side, like the public can come down that hallway and there's actually like large glass window. And they can -- the public can view that through the glass.

- Q. The policy of sort of the -- the policy and the culture is that's a good thing; right? They ought to be able to see what you're doing. Is that fair to say?
- A. I'll say that the board is of that -- you know, the board -- like from what I've seen, the majority of the board is very much in favor of that.

And I can say -- I don't think that -- like there's been -- I haven't seen staff make an effort to obstruct that window or anything like that.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

Q. Let me take you back to the actual work that the voter review panel does.

It's sort of mechanically looking on a computer screen at different images of ballots that have been put in by the computer for the panel's review; correct? You're looking at a screen; right?

- A. Yes. That's correct.
- Q. And the three of you are looking at it and there's an ambiguous vote. Let's just say all three of you go, Oh, yeah, that clearly is a vote for Smith; right?
- 12 A. Mm-hmm.
 - Q. Then what happens?
 - A. Then the person -- the way it's worked so far is that we have a Dominion tech, like a person assigned to us to help us with this machinery and stuff. And so far it's been that that person clicks you know, the option in the -- the option in the computer system in the software to change that -- like to make that ambiguous mark a vote that's counted.
 - Q. And that's it; right? That's a vote that's counted; right?
 - A. Yeah. And there's a second -- so every -- every ballot that's scanned through has at the bottom

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

there's an audit mark, which is like a summary of 1 what the computer system sort of recognized and did 2. with each race, each contest. And whenever the voter 3 review panel, if they discover that there's a mark 4 made on the ballot that wasn't counted as a vote but 5 that should be counted as a vote, once they make that 6 7 change, a second audit mark is added to the bottom of the ballot record. 8

- Q. At the end of the day is there a paper trail to be able to determine what decisions and on what ballots the voter review panel made?
- A. You mean like a report or something that can be generated?
 - Q. Yeah, or some audit trail.
- A. So that's a good question. I -- in my experience when I've asked questions about, Can we pull up the ballots that were audited -- or, I'm sorry, that were adjudicated and changes made to them and stuff, I've been told by staff, no, that can't happen. Like we can look at the -- go back and manually review, right, and you can look at the audit marks. And if there's two audit marks, they were changed by the vote review panel, like the vote review panel made a change as far as how the system counted the vote or didn't count the vote.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.1

25

8/16/2020

But, to my knowledge, there's not like a running log of the ballot at this precinct for this election. This was adjudicated by VRP.

- Q. Hang on one second.
- A. Now, they have the batches, like they have the queue and the system that they utilized. But as far as like saving that list somewhere, I don't know that that's -- I don't know.
 - Q. Has -- let me change topics entirely.

For both the June and the August elections,

I believe you said -- I don't know if this was on the
record -- but that you went to a number of different
polling locations just to see how things were going.

- A. For June I did. In August, we only had three polling locations.
- Q. Were you able to assess the effectiveness of the electronic poll pads for their intended purpose just in general?
 - A. When I was visiting?
- 20 Q. Yes.
 - A. No.
- Q. Have you had any -- have you observed problems with them or -- either firsthand or reports of problems?
 - A. Yes.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

8/16/2020

Q. And what problems did you either see or were reported to you?

- A. One person sent a message, an E-mail, I believe, recently in August saying that they had had issues with it, with the poll panel -- or the poll pad. And I can pull up the E-mail if you would like to recap what they said.
 - Q. That's all right. Just the gist of it.
- A. Basically, the sensitivity of the signature, like tools -- you know, when they have to sign off on it. And also they said that the components, like the wiring, the ports and stuff were not optimal as far as, you know, maintaining the structural integrity of those things over time and preventing them from disconnected and things of that nature.
- Q. In general, did it seem like they basically were working okay?
- A. I didn't see -- I've not seen lot of complaints about our poll pads in Clarke County.
- Q. Do you have any paper backup for the poll pads that you use, that the polling locations use?
- A. To my knowledge, yes, they have paper backup but also there's a -- you know, if there's -- if the poll worker has a problem at the poll pad as far as like a voter not showing up on their poll pad but

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

also not on their back-up list on paper, then they just call the Board of Elections office and have staff there look up the person in the system.

- Q. And what system would they look -- what system would the Board of Elections person look into?
- A. The system that has our official voter rolls.
- Q. Are you familiar with the concern about the DREs -- I'm moving on to a different topic here -- the DREs that were used in the Winterville polling location for the mid-term elections in 2018?
 - A. Say again. I'm sorry.
- Q. Moving on to DREs -- and I'm referring to the 2018 election, the midterms. Are you aware of any concerns about the DREs that were used in the Winterville precinct?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. What did you learn about that, those issues?
- A. So I've seen media coverage of concerns about these machines at the Winterville train depot polling location in 2018 of the voting data on them being statistically anomalous in a way that is very, very unlikely statistically speaking.
- Q. What, if anything, did you or the board do to secure the particular DREs that were used?

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

A. We were -- when we found out about it, we put it on our next agenda. And we wanted to find out what was going on about it and actually like get to the bottom of this.

And we had been told that those machines were to be placed in quarantine and held. And we were basically given a directive -- like our staff was given a directive by the state -- secretary of state's office to put those machines aside.

- Q. As far as you know, were those machines set aside?
- A. I recently discovered that not all those machines were set aside. That was recently found out that not all of those machines were set out.
- Q. How do you know? What did you -- how did you find --
- A. There was a report that was created by staff that someone shared with me that said that two of them -- two of the machines, I believe, were actually like put in an area of our facility that's for equipment that needs to be repaired. And then they weren't actually stored with the quarantined machines; and also that those machines have -- when we sent -- when the state came and picked up all the DREs and stuff for the switchover to Dominion BMDs,

```
that those machines, I believe, were collected and
 1
    taken by the state.
 2.
             And I'm told that it was an accident, you
 3
    know, made by staff; that it wasn't -- you know, that
 4
    the -- the paper that I saw said that it was the --
 5
    the machines were set over there in that area of our
 6
 7
    facility -- storage facility for repair and that,
    basically, it was like an oversight, I believe, is
 8
    what was claimed on the document.
 9
             Let me just -- you're referencing a report
10
         Ο.
    by staff. That's the elections staff in Athens?
11
                   By one member of the elections staff.
         Α.
12
             Yes.
13
         0.
             Who wrote the report?
             Lisa McGlaum's name is on the report, I
14
    believe.
15
         Q.
             Spell that name for me.
16
         Α.
             Lisa, L-I-S-A.
17
         Ο.
             Got that.
18
         Α.
             McGlaum, M-C-G-L-A-U-M.
19
20
         Ο.
             When was that report written?
             I don't know, actually. I can look at the
2.1
         Α.
    report and tell you.
2.2
23
         0.
             Sure.
             Is that all right?
         Α.
2.4
                    Or you can just send it to me.
25
         Q.
             Yeah.
```

8/16/2020

A. I've got it right here, but, I mean, I can share it with you, too, if that's something you would like.

- Q. Why don't you just E-mail it to me?
- A. Okay.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

20

23

2.4

- Q. So just to make sure I've got the overview here, there were a total of eight machines -- or seven or eight machines that were actually used in Winterville; is that right?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And two of the ones that were actually used in Winterville got accidentally joined with other DREs in the repair -- (audio fades) -- and then taken by the state when they did their big sweep; correct?
 - A. That's my understanding.
- Q. Did that leave -- how many?
- A. Just a second. I don't have like a PDF of that report, photos of that report that somebody sent me.
 - Q. Don't worry about that.
- A. But I can tell you the date that's on the report, if you'd like, for when it was prepared.
 - Q. What's the date?
 - A. August 13th, 2020.
- Q. With the exception of the two machines that

1

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

were put in the wrong place, are you aware of any other security issues relating to the Winterville machines?

A. I'm sorry. Just a moment. I was reviewing the document just now to make sure that I've been clear on what it says.

MR. BROWN: Okay.

(Witness reviewing document.)

THE WITNESS: Yeah. Apparently, it was one machine, according to this report, one DRE that was not used. It was assigned to Winterville, but it wasn't used in November of 2018. And it was put in the hospital area of the warehouse, quote, unquote, where they set them up for equipment in need of repair. And then the other one was machine number two that was used on November 2018.

BY MR. BROWN:

- Q. Okay. And then apart from that issue, were there any other security or custody issues relating to the other machines that were used in Winterville?
 - A. Could you clarify your question?
 - Q. I'm just trying to sort of wrap-up.

You mentioned that -- the problem with the two. Were there any other problems? Like were five

```
of them hacked, for example? I just want to make
 1
    sure I got the whole story.
 2.
             To my knowledge, there -- there were eight.
 3
             I just need to sort of finish up and make
 4
         0.
    sure --
 5
             There were eight machines that I've seen
         Α.
 6
 7
    personally that were in quarantine in the office --
    like in what used to be called the EMS room.
 8
    sure what they call it now, now that we switched
 9
           It's a secured room, but it's also in the
10
    office of Lisa McGlaum.
11
                         Let me do this. Let me talk
             MR. BROWN:
12
         with my clients for a couple of minutes.
13
14
         And let's take a five-minute break and then
         we'll wind up with just a few questions.
15
         Okay?
16
             THE WITNESS:
                            Okay.
17
             MR. BROWN: Great.
                                  Thanks.
18
             (Recess from 4:15 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.)
19
20
    BY MR. BROWN:
             Mr. Evans, I want to go back to the topic of
2.1
    the -- (audio fades) -- software and the ballot
2.2
    review panel.
23
             One issue --
2.4
                                        I'm sorry.
         Α.
             Will you represent that?
25
```

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

2.4

25

8/16/2020

Q. Go back to -- make sure I have the word right.

What is the panel called that reviews the ambiguous votes?

- A. The vote review panel.
- Q. The vote review panel, when it was doing its work, it was looking at the images on a computer screen; correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. So when you were looking at voter intent, you weren't looking at an actual physical ballot that was cast; were you?
- A. Correct. We were not. The vote review panel was not looking at a physical like paper ballot. That's the one that was actually physically marked on. It was looking at scanned images.
- Q. Let me direct your attention to the issue we talked about some and that was the concern about votes that weren't counted.

I believe it was your testimony that you had concerns about the ballots that weren't flagged by the adjudication software that might have on them what you saw were uncounted votes on ballots that the adjudication software didn't flag for other reasons.

Do you follow me?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

20

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

8/16/2020

A. Correct.

- Q. Did you actually see on those ballots that were sent to you to adjudicate votes that should have been counted?
- A. If you're referring to the August election, there was an ambiguous -- there was one ambiguous ballot that was adjudicated by the vote review panel in August. And that did have a mark on it that needed to be adjudicated and that was a vote. The vote review panel determined that that was actually a vote and counted it as a vote and --
 - O. That was all --
 - A. I'm sorry?
- Q. August was just one race, so you didn't have the -- that fact pattern come up; right?
- A. Right. But in June I was able to observe -- I was not on the vote review panel in June. We had a different person doing that on behalf of the board.

19 It was a different board member.

However, I was able to observe through the looking glass -- the window. And I saw many ballots that were like that, that were -- the adjudication software had flagged it, the ballot for the VRP to look at based upon the parameters that were in place for at least one contest.

8/16/2020

However, there were other contests that were 1 not flagged for adjudication but the vote review 2. panel like was doing due diligence and looking at the 3 entire ballot front and back. And it noticed that 4 there were voter marks that were not counted as a 5 vote but also were not flagged for adjudication. 6 7 Ο. That must have meant that they fell beneath the 12 percent threshold? 8 Assuming that the software did what it 9 Yes. 10 was programmed to do. If the software did what it was programmed 11 to do, at 12 percent the software is not catching 12 13 what were clearly intended to be votes for particular races; correct? 14 Well, anything below the lower threshold, 15 they are not catching those. 16 Right. But what I'm saying is you saw 17 Ο. markings that were clearly votes --18 Α. Yes. 19 20 -- and it was not catching at 12 percent; correct? 2.1 And that had not been counted as Α. Yes. Yes. 2.2 And that happened many times. 23 votes. MR. BROWN: Okay. I think that's all I 2.4 have. 25

Statement Under Oath
JESSE EVANS

```
So did you want to add anything or -- I
 1
         appreciate you extra time today. I really
 2
         do on a Sunday.
 3
             THE WITNESS: No. I don't think I have
 4
         anything else to add.
 5
             MR. BROWN: Let's go off the record
 6
         then.
 7
              (Proceeding concluded at 4:35 p.m.)
 8
              (Signature reserved.)
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

Statement Under Oath JESSE EVANS

8/16/2020

CERTIFICATE 1 2 STATE OF GEORGIA: 3 COUNTY OF FULTON: 4 5 I hereby certify that the foregoing 6 7 transcript was taken down, as stated in the caption, and the colloquies, questions, and answers were 8 reduced to typewriting under my direction; that the 9 transcript is a true and correct record of the 10 evidence given upon said proceeding. 11 I further certify that I am not a relative 12 or employee or attorney of any party, nor am I 13 financially interested in the outcome of this action. 14 This the 31st day of August, 2020. 15 16 17 18 19 20 Marsi Koehl, CCR-B-2424 2.1 2.2 23 2.4 25

Statement Under Oath
JESSE EVANS

```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1
              FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
                         ATLANTA DIVISION
2
3
   DONNA CURLING, et al.,
4
         Plaintiffs,
5
                                     CIVIL FILE ACTION
    vs.
6
                                     NO. 1:17-cv-02989-AT
7
    BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, et al.,
8
         Defendants.
9
10
11
         The preceding statement under oath taken in the
12
    matter, on the date, and at the time and place set out
13
    on the title page hereof.
14
15
16
         It was requested that the statement under oath be
17
    taken by the reporter and that same be reduced to
    typewritten form.
18
19
         It was agreed by and between counsel and the
20
    parties that the Witness will read and sign the
21
22
    transcript of said statement under oath.
23
2.4
25
```

Statement Under Oath
JESSE EVANS

1	CERTIFICATE		
2	STATE OF COUNTY/CITY OF		
3			
4	Before me, this day, personally appeared, JESSE EVANS, who, being duly sworn, states that the foregoing transcript of his statement under oath, taken in the matter, on the date, and at the time and place set out on the title page hereof, constitutes a true and accurate transcript of said statement under		
5			
6			
7	oath.		
8			
9			
10	JESSE EVANS		
11			
12			
13	SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this		
14	day of, 2020 in the		
15	jurisdiction aforesaid.		
16			
17			
18	My Commission Expires Notary Public		
19			
20			
21	[] No changes made to the Errata Sheet; therefore, I		
22	am returning only this signed notarized certificate.		
23			
24	[] I am returning this signed, notarized certificate		
25	and Errata Sheet with changes noted.		

Statement Under Oath JESSE EVANS

1	STATEMENT UNDER OATH ERRATA SHEET		
2	Deponent: JESSE EVANS		
3	Date: August 16, 2020		
4	To Reporter:		
5	I request that the following changes be entered upon		
6	the record for the reasons indicated. I have signed		
7	my name to the Errata Sheet and appropriate		
8	Certificate and authorize you to attach both to the		
9	original transcript.		
10			
11	Page No. Line No.		
12	Change to:		
13	Reason for Change:		
14			
15	Page No. Line No.		
16	Change to:		
17	Reason for Change:		
18			
19	Page No. Line No.		
20	Change to:		
21	Reason for Change:		
22			
23			
24	Signature: Date:		
25	JESSE EVANS		

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Athens-Clarke County Director of Elections and Voter Registration, the full-time staff and other employees and volunteers should to the maximum extent practicable implement the following policy regarding precinct layout:

- 1. Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-367, the number of "voting booths or enclosures" required in each precinct on election day is to be computed as follows:
 - Divide the number of active voters in that precinct as of the close of the registration period (usually 30 days before election day) by 250
 - Round the result up to the nearest whole number

So, for example, a precinct with 251 active voters would require 2 voting booths.

The required number of "voting booths or enclosures" in a precinct can be satisfied by a combination of ballot-marking devices (BMDs) and voting booths or enclosures suitable for voting by paper ballot.

So, for example, a precinct that requires 10 "voting booths or enclosures" could have 4 BMDs and 6 places suitable for marking paper ballots.

- 3. A precinct should have no more BMDs than can be arranged in a manner that is consistent with the Secretary of State's guidance on ensuring voter privacy (a copy of which is attached). If that number is less than the number of "voting booths or enclosures" required by law in that precinct, the remaining number should consist of paper-ballot voting booths.
- 4. In order to remain consistent with the Secretary of State's guidance on ensuring voter privacy, BMDs should be arranged in accordance with the following principles.
- a. Voters who are checking in, waiting in line, or using a magnifying station should not be able to see the screen of any BMD.
- b. Poll workers should not be able to see the screen of any BMD except when necessary to assist a voter.
- c. BMD screens should face the wall and should preferably be positioned back to back rather than side by side.
- d. If BMDs are positioned side by side, there should be an extended privacy screen between them, as illustrated by the attached photo.

- e. BMDs should be arranged so that no voter has to walk behind any other voter in order to get to a machine. Aisles of BMDs (see attached photo) are therefore strongly discouraged.
 - f. There should be no more than two BMDs on any banquet table.
- 5. A paper-ballot voting booth could be a table or a part of a table if appropriate screening is used to ensure voter privacy. See the attached photo. A provisional voting station counts as a "voting booth or enclosure" as long as it meets this guideline.
- 6. Paper ballots—and paper-ballot voting booths—should only be used in cases of emergency. Under the Georgia Administrative Code, examples of emergencies justifying the use of paper ballots include "power outages, malfunctions causing a sufficient number of electronic ballot markers to be unavailable for use, or waiting times longer than 30 minutes." Ga. R. & R. 183-1-12-.11(2)(d).

All poll managers should be trained on the use of paper ballots in the case of an emergency and should be instructed to monitor the length of the lines. If, in the poll manager's judgment, waiting times are longer than 30 minutes, paper ballots should be used (in addition to BMDs) until the emergency is resolved.

7. No number of voting booths is required during the early voting period. Accordingly, guidelines 1 and 2, above, do not apply. However, early voting locations should be arranged in a manner that is consistent with guidelines 3 and 4.

AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the foregoing shall become and is the policy of the Athens-Clarke County Board of Elections and Registrations.

SO RESOLVED this 1st day of April, 2020.

Jesse Evans, Chairperson	Charles Knapper, Vice Chairperson
Willa J. Fambrough, Secretary	Patricia A. Till, Member
Rocky Raffle, Member	